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 1 AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (AIUSA), Another 
Texas Injustice: The Case of Kelsey Patterson, Mentally Ill Man Facing Execution, at 5 
(Mar. 2004) (letter from Kelsey Patterson to a federal court), available at 
http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGAMR510472004 (last visited Jan. 27, 2005) 
[hereinafter AIUSA, Another Texas Injustice].  
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INTRODUCTION  
On May 18, 2004, the State of Texas executed Kelsey 
Patterson, a man long diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia, 
for the murders of Louis Oates and Dorothy Harris.2 Twelve 
years earlier, Patterson had gone to the loading dock of Oates 
Oil Company and shot Oates with a .38-caliber Pistol.3 
Patterson then killed Oates’ secretary when she walked out of 
her office and screamed at finding Oates’ body on the ground.4 
Patterson made no effort to conceal the crimes. Instead, he 
returned home, informed his roommate of what he had done,5 
undressed to his socks, and began pacing and shouting in the 
street.6  
After Patterson was found competent to stand trial,7 his 
lawyers raised the insanity defense.8 Patterson never asserted 
a motive for the killings.9 Throughout his legal proceedings, he 
claimed to be controlled by outside forces through implants and 
to be a victim of conspiracy and poisoning.10 Though Patterson 
  
 2 David Carson, Texas Execution Information Center, Kelsey Patterson, at 
http://www.txexecutions.org/reports/322.asp (last visited Dec. 19, 2004).  
 3 Patterson v. Cockrell, 69 Fed.Appx. 658, 2003 WL 21355999, at **1 (5th Cir. 
May 23, 2003). 
 4 Carson, supra note 2. 
 5 Patterson, 2003 WL 21355999, at **1. 
 6 AIUSA, Another Texas Injustice, supra note 1, at 1. 
 7 Patterson, 2003 WL 21355999, at **1. At Patterson’s competency hearing 
before a jury, defense counsel had relied on the cross-examination of the state’s 
witnesses, clinical psychologist Walter Quijano and forensic psychiatrist James 
Grigson. AIUSA, Another Texas Injustice, supra note 1, at 6. Neither of these expert 
witnesses evaluated Patterson in person. Patterson, 2003 WL 21355999, at **5. Based 
on his records alone, Dr. Quijano diagnosed Patterson with schizophrenia and Dr. 
Grigson proposed that Patterson had learned to fake psychosis. Id. Both doctors 
believed Patterson was competent to stand trial. Id. 
 8 The contemporary notion of insanity in American criminal law has its roots 
in the famed M’Naghten case of 1843. See Cynthia G. Hawkins-Leon, “Literature as 
Law”: The History of the Insanity Plea and a Fictional Application Within the Law & 
Literature Canon, 72 TEMP. L. REV. 381 (1999). Daniel M’Naghten was found not guilty 
by reason of insanity in England after shooting to death Edward Drummond while in 
the grip of extreme paranoia and believing Drummond to be the prime minister. Id. at 
390-92. This verdict caused Queen Victoria to question the rationale behind the 
decision of the House of Lords, prompting a series of questions that resulted in the 
M’Naghten Rule: 
[T]o establish a defence on the ground of insanity, it must be clearly proved 
that, at the time of the committing of the act, the party accused was 
labouring under such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind, as not to 
know the nature and quality of the act he was doing; or if he did know it, that 
he did not know he was doing what was wrong.  
Id. at 392.  
 9 Patterson, 2003 WL 21355999, at **1. See also AIUSA, Another Texas 
Injustice, at 1.  
 10 AIUSA, Another Texas Injustice, supra note 1, at 1, 6. 
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continually interrupted trial proceedings to insist that he was a 
victim of conspiracy,11 the judge did not return to the issue of 
competency.12 Further, the prosecution elicited testimony that 
it was feasible to feign psychotic symptoms.13 Even more 
significantly, the prosecution intermittently punctuated the 
trial with statements that encouraged the jury to treat 
Patterson’s schizophrenia as an indicator of future 
dangerousness.14 The jury deliberated about four hours before 
recommending the death penalty.15 
The low standard for competence, the effects of severe 
mental illness on the defendant’s courtroom behavior, and the 
tendency for the prosecutor to present a mental disorder as an 
aggravating factor instead of a mitigating factor exemplify the 
serious disadvantages a severely mentally ill defendant faces in 
capital proceedings. Such circumstances have led state 
lawmakers to consider adding a sentence of life without the 
possibility of parole in Texas.16 Public outcry over Patterson’s 
execution,17 and the execution of others with a similar 
psychiatric background,18 reflect the burgeoning controversy 
over whether individuals with severe mental illness should be 
excluded from capital punishment. 
In June of 2002, the Supreme Court in Atkins v. 
Virginia19 found it unconstitutional to execute people with 
mental retardation.20 The Court convincingly demonstrated 
that the execution of criminals with mental retardation 
  
 11 Id. at 10-11. 
 12 Id. at 11. 
 13 Patterson, 2003 WL 21355999, at **5. 
 14 See text accompanying footnote 209, infra. 
 15 AIUSA, Another Texas Injustice, supra note 1, at 13. 
 16 Scott Gold, The Nation; Texas Weighs Its Life or Death Decisions; The 
Execution of A Schizophrenic Man Helps Build Support for A New Sentencing Option in 
Capital Cases: Life without Parole. L.A. TIMES, Aug. 15, 2004, at A17. See also Mary 
Alice Robbins, A Preview of the Action the 79th Texas Legislature Will See, 20 TEXAS 
LAWYER 14, Jan. 10, 2005.  
 17 See Gold, supra note 16. See also Editorial, Our View: Two More Death 
Penalty Inequities, SPRINGFIELD NEWS-LEADER, May 21, 2004, at 8A; Cato Meador, 
Editorial, Letter Regarding Kelsey Patterson, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, May 30, 2004, at 
2H. Dr. Maria Felix-Ortiz, In Texas, Mental-Health Spending Is Down, Executions 
Continue, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS, June 9, 2004, at 9G. 
 18 See generally Editorial, Executing the Mentally Ill; The Execution of a 
Person Who Has Suffers [sic] from Mental Illness is Cruel and Unusual and Should Be 
Outlawed, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS, Apr. 6, 2003, at 02H; Editorial, Genuine Justice 
Calls for Sparing Severely Mentally Ill, HOUSTON CHRONICLE, Nov. 6, 2002, at 42. 
 19 536 U.S. 304 (2002). 
 20 Id. Because mental retardation and other mental disorders classify 
disorders and not the people themselves, this author attempts to avoid expressions 
such as “mentally retarded” or “schizophrenic.”  
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amounts to cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the 
Eighth Amendment, given their diminished culpability due to 
factors ranging from subaverage intellect to impaired social 
functioning.21 The Atkins rationale compels the conclusion that 
the death penalty should likewise be found unconstitutional as 
imposed on defendants with a severe mental disorder who 
suffer from similar disabling effects.  
This Note proposes a categorical exemption from capital 
punishment for individuals with severe mental disorders. To 
provide necessary context for the analysis, this Note first 
discusses the Eighth Amendment’s mandate that capital 
punishment be commensurate with the character of the 
defendant and his or her criminal offense, and the Supreme 
Court’s corresponding emphasis on proportionality review and 
moral culpability. Part Two looks closely at the Supreme 
Court’s discussion of reduced moral culpability in capital 
defendants with mental retardation in Atkins. Part Three 
reviews state death penalty statute provisions that have a 
bearing on mental illness and the viewpoints of various justices 
and communities towards the execution of the mentally ill to 
demonstrate that people with severe mental illness should also 
be considered less morally culpable. Part Four examines the 
nature of severe mental disorders and compares how mental 
retardation and severe mental illness impact the individual. In 
Part Five, the cases of Kelsey Patterson, James Colburn, and 
Charles Walker illustrate how the experiences of defendants 
with severe mental disorders in capital proceedings implicate 
the exact concerns expressed by the Supreme Court in Atkins. 
Finally, Part Six cautions against limiting the scope of severe 
mental illness as a mitigator and addresses the implications of 
applying Atkins to offenders with severe mental disorders. Part 
Seven concludes this Note with comments on the evolving 
standards of decency in the United States. 
I. THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT, PERSONAL CULPABILITY, AND 
THE PENOLOGICAL JUSTIFICATIONS OF THE DEATH 
PENALTY   
The Eighth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution prohibits the use of “cruel and unusual 
punishments.”22 In capital cases, the Supreme Court has 
  
 21 Id. 
 22 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.  
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generally construed this prohibition to mean that a sentence of 
death must not be excessive and must serve some penological 
justification, such as retribution or deterrence, so as not to 
result in the “gratuitous infliction of suffering.”23 The Court has 
further held that certain crimes that do not involve the taking 
of human life are per se ineligible for the death penalty because 
such a sentence would be excessive.24 Certain individuals might 
also be ineligible regardless of the crime committed.25 This bar 
might occur when, taking into account the individual’s 
character and background, the death penalty would offend 
“currently prevailing standards of decency.”26  
The idea that “punishment should be directly related to 
the personal culpability of the criminal defendant”27 has been 
central to the Court’s analysis of whether the death sentence is 
excessive.28 Indeed, the reality that not every defendant in a 
capital case is sentenced to death reflects the attitude that 
“only the most deserving” should be executed.29 Proportionality 
review implies that some capital defendants may not be 
culpable enough to warrant the death penalty.30 The fact that 
the individual’s level of culpability lies on a continuum is 
reflected by state statutes that provide for the assessment of 
mitigating and aggravating circumstances in capital trials. It is 
only at the extreme end of this continuum that the public will 
deem the criminal deserving of execution.31 In this way, the 
death penalty becomes “an expression of society’s moral 
outrage at particularly offensive conduct.”32  
Deterrence also plays a role in considerations of capital 
sentencing. The Court has found that “the death penalty has 
little deterrent force against defendants who have reduced 
  
 23 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 182-83 (1976). 
 24 See, e.g., Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977) (holding that the death 
penalty was a disproportionate punishment for rape). 
 25 Alyssa C. Lareau & Grant H. Willis, Thirty-First Annual Review of 
Criminal Procedure IV. Sentencing, Capital Punishment, 90 GEO. L.J. 1838, 1842 
(2002). 
 26 See Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988). 
 27 Thompson, 487 U.S. at 834 (quoting California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 545 
(1987)). 
 28 Van W. Ellis, Note, Guilty but Mentally Ill and the Death Penalty: 
Punishment Full of Sound and Fury, Signifying Nothing, 43 DUKE L.J. 87, 90 (1994). 
 29 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 319 (2002). 
 30 Ellis, supra note 28, at 90. 
 31 Joseph A. Nese, The Fate of Mentally Retarded Criminals: An Examination 
of the Propriety of Their Execution Under the Eighth Amendment, 40 DUQ. L. REV. 373, 
401 (2002). 
 32 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183 (1976). 
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capacity for considered choice.”33 When the death penalty does 
not serve either the goal of retribution or that of deterrence, it 
purposelessly imposes pain and suffering.34  
Accordingly, the Court has held that the provisions of 
the Eighth Amendment require an analysis of the defendant’s 
personal culpability in capital sentencing and an assessment of 
whether the aims of retribution or deterrence are met. These 
requirements come to bear significantly on the Supreme Court 
holding in Atkins. 
II. THE SUPREME COURT FINDINGS ON MENTAL 
RETARDATION IN ATKINS V. VIRGINIA 
In Atkins, the Supreme Court barred the execution of 
individuals with mental retardation finding that although the 
deficiencies of mental retardation did not exempt a defendant 
from criminal responsibility, they did diminish his or her moral 
culpability.35 The Court premised its holding on the Eighth 
Amendment’s bar against excessive punishment and the 
accompanying need for proportionality review.36 As the Court 
had pointed out in Penry v. Lynaugh,37 such proportionality 
review is best informed by the actions of state legislatures.38 
Hence, the Court reviewed state death penalty statutes, 
examined the evidence of a national consensus against capital 
punishment for persons with mental retardation, and noted the 
impact of mental retardation on these defendants. 
The Atkins Court evaluated whether society regards 
people with mental retardation less culpable than the average 
criminal by observing the changes in state death penalty laws 
that had been enacted since 1986.39 That year marked the 
execution of Jerome Bowden, a Georgia death row inmate said 
to have an IQ of 65.40 Bowden’s execution led to the first state 
statute bar against execution of offenders with mental 
retardation.41 In the next few years, Georgia and Maryland 
enacted death penalty legislation prohibiting capital 
  
 33 Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 13 (1986). 
 34 Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977). 
 35 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 320 (2002). 
 36 Id. at 311. 
 37 492 U.S. 302 (1989). 
 38 Id. at 330-31. 
 39 Id. at 313-14. 
 40 Id. at 313 n.8.  
 41 Id. at 313-14. 
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punishment for people with mental retardation.42 The decision 
in Penry followed in 1989, in which the Court found that the 
defendant’s mental retardation alone did not exempt him from 
capital punishment under the Eighth Amendment.43 The Court 
later reversed Penry’s death sentence, however, on the ground 
that the statute deprived the sentencer of an adequate means 
of giving mitigating effect to Penry’s mental retardation.44 In 
response to Bowden’s execution and Penry, many state 
legislatures enacted death penalty statutes similar to the laws 
of Georgia and Maryland. The Atkins Court noted that the 
State trend45 of barring execution of persons with mental 
retardation indicated that society has come to regard such 
people as less culpable.46  
In further support of its finding of a national consensus, 
the Court noted that professional organizations such as the 
American Psychological Association and the American 
Association on Mental Retardation (AAMR), recognized for 
their expertise in mental health, had officially taken a stance 
against imposing the death penalty on criminal offenders with 
mental retardation.47 Additionally, the Court reported that 
various religious groups had together filed an amicus curiae 
brief on behalf of a petitioner with mental retardation, because 
despite their differences, these amici “share a conviction that 
the execution of persons with mental retardation cannot be 
morally justified.”48 The Court then acknowledged the 
widespread disapproval within the world community of 
executing offenders with mental retardation.49 The Court found 
this consensus to reflect a “widespread judgment about the 
relative culpability of mentally retarded offenders, and the 
relationship between mental retardation and the penological 
purposes served by the death penalty.”50  
Moreover, the Court noted that “some characteristics of 
mental retardation undermine the strength of the procedural 
  
 42 Penry, 492 U.S. at 314.  
 43 Id. at 340. 
 44 See Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 804 (2001). 
 45 As the Court specifically stated: “It is not so much the number of these 
States that is significant, but the consistency of the direction of change.” Atkins v. 
Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 315 (2002). 
 46 Id. at 314-16. 
 47 Id. at 316 n.21 (citation omitted). 
 48 Id. 
 49 Id. 
 50 Atkins, 536 U.S. at 317. 
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protections that our capital jurisprudence steadfastly guards.”51 
According to the AAMR, a person considered to have mental 
retardation exhibits an intelligence quotient (IQ) of somewhere 
around 70 to 75 at the highest, as well as deficits manifested by 
problems with self-care, social interaction, employment, 
education, and health.52 A person is diagnosed with mental 
retardation if subaverage intelligence and limitations in 
adaptive functioning are present before the individual turns 
eighteen years old.53 Discussing the impact of mental 
retardation on the offender’s thought processes, the Court 
acknowledged that people with mental retardation are 
paradoxically often found competent to stand trial, despite 
reduced capacities to analyze information, think logically, 
articulate, learn from mistakes, and comprehend human 
behavior.54 The Court noted that even given these deficiencies, 
“[t]here is no evidence that they are more likely to engage in 
criminal conduct than others, but there is abundant evidence 
that they often act on impulse rather than pursuant to a 
premeditated plan.”55 
The Court found these cognitive and behavioral defects 
to reduce the moral culpability of defendants with mental 
retardation.56 Consequently, where the death penalty is 
typically not appropriate retribution for crimes committed by a 
person of average intelligence, it offends contemporary 
standards of decency in the case of defendants with mental 
retardation.57 Furthermore, deterrence is not measurably 
served by executing individuals who are unable to see that 
certain acts might result in the death penalty, and so cannot 
adjust their conduct accordingly.58 
  
 51 Id. at 318. 
 52 Id. at 308 n.3. See also AMERICAN ASSOCIATION ON MENTAL RETARDATION 
(AAMR), Definition of Mental Retardation, available at http://www.aamr.org/Policies/ 
faq_mental_retardation.shtml (last visited Feb. 28, 2005). 
 53 AAMR, supra note 52. The American Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic 
and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders Fourth Edition (DSM-IV) criteria parallel 
that of AAMR. See AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DSM-IV 39-46 (1994). Adaptive functioning 
or behavior refers to “the collection of conceptual, social, and practical skills that people 
have learned so they can function in their everyday lives. Significant limitations in 
adaptive behavior impact a person’s daily life and affect the ability to respond to a 
particular situation or to the environment.” AAMR, Fact Sheet: Frequently Asked 
Questions about Mental Retardation, available at http://www.aamr.org/Policies/ 
faq_mental_retardation.shtml (last visited Dec. 23, 2004). 
 54 See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 318. 
 55 Id. 
 56 Id. at 320. 
 57 Id. at 319. 
 58 Id. at 320. 
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In addition to recognizing that retribution and 
deterrence are not furthered by imposing the death penalty on 
people with mental retardation, the Court determined that 
such individuals suffer significant disadvantages during legal 
proceedings.59 Because of the reduced capacity that mental 
retardation causes, defendants are more vulnerable to 
situations generating false confessions and they are sometimes 
unable to assist counsel or provide adequate testimony.60 
Equally as crucial, jurors might misperceive the attitudes of 
the defendants towards their crimes based on their outward 
appearance, which “may create an unwarranted impression of 
lack of remorse for their crimes.”61 Perhaps even more 
important, evidence of mental retardation as a mitigating 
factor can act as a “two-edged sword” that jurors also regard as 
an indicator of future dangerousness.62 Given all these 
encumbrances, the Court concluded that defendants with 
mental retardation “face a special risk of wrongful execution.”63 
The weight the Court gives to functional and cognitive 
impairment in assessing both culpability and vulnerability in 
legal proceedings casts serious doubt on the constitutionality of 
imposing the death penalty on individuals with severe mental 
illness. Thus, where defendants experience impaired cognitive 
and adaptive functioning that reduce culpability and lead to 
vulnerabilities during legal proceedings, and where evidence 
exists that society denounces capital punishment for such 
persons, the Supreme Court should exempt severely mentally 
ill offenders from the death penalty. 
  
 59 Atkins, 536 U.S. at 320-21. 
 60 Id. 
 61 Id. at 321. 
 62 Id. at 320-21. 
 63 Id. at 321. 
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III. APPLYING THE RATIONALE OF ATKINS TO OFFENDERS 
WITH SEVERE MENTAL DISORDERS  
A. State Death Penalty Statutes64 and Severe Mental Illness 
as a Mitigating Factor    
The overwhelming majority of state statutes contain 
mitigating factors that implicate mental illness.65 Many capital 
statutes, like the Model Penal Code, permit the defendant to 
proffer evidence that the offense was committed “under the 
influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance” as a 
mitigating circumstance relevant to determination of a 
sentence less than death.66 Some states do not even require that 
such mental or emotional disturbance be “extreme,” but only 
that the condition had an “influence” on the defendant’s 
conduct at the time of the offense.67  
  
 64 Currently, over one-fifth of state jurisdictions do not have death penalty 
statutes. Alaska, Hawaii, Iowa, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, North 
Dakota, Rhode Island, Vermont, West Virginia, Wisconsin. Deborah Fins, Death Row 
U.S.A. Summer 2004, A Quarterly Report by the Criminal Justice Project of the NAACP 
Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc., at 1, 3, available at http://www.naac 
pldf.org/content/pdf/pubs/drusa/DRUSA_Summer_2004.pdf (last visited Feb. 27, 2005). 
This absence automatically excludes individuals with severe mental illness from 
capital punishment in twelve states, as well as the District of Columbia. Id. 
 65 See Kyron Huigens, Homicide in Aretaic Terms, 6 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 97, 
n.108 (2002). See also Ellen F. Berkman, Mental Illness as an Aggravating 
Circumstance in Capital Sentencing, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 291, 297-98 (1989). See also 
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION SECTION OF INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES, 
Death without Justice: A Guide for Examining the Administration of the Death Penalty 
in the United States, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 487, 529 (2002) (noting that those death penalty 
statutes following the Model Penal Code implicate mental illness). 
 66 See Ellen Fels Berkman, Mental Illness as an Aggravating Circumstance in 
Capital Sentencing, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 291, 296-98 (1989) (emphasis added). See also 
MPC 210.6(4)(b). See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-605(1) (2004); CAL. PENAL CODE § 
190.3(d) (2005); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(6)(b) (2004); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/9-
1(c)(2) (2004); IND. CODE § 35-50-2-9(c)(2) (2005); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4626(2) (2003); 
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.025 (2004)(2)(b)(2); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 905.5(b) 
(2004); MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-19-101(6)(b) (2004); MO. ANN. STAT. § 565.032(3)(2) 
(2004); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-18-304(b) (2004); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 29-2523(2)(c) 
(2004); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. 200.035(2) (2004); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 630:5(VI)(f) 
(2004) (refers to an offense committed under “severe mental or emotional disturbance”); 
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-3(5)(a) (2004); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9711(e)(2) (2004); TENN. 
CODE ANN. § 39-13-204(j)(2) (2004); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.4(B)(i)-(ii) (2004); WYO. 
STAT. ANN. § 6-2-102(j)(ii)-(iii) (2004).  
 67 See NM Stat. Ann. § 31-20A-6; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(f)(2) (2005); NY 
CPL § 400.27 (9)(e). See also S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-20(C)(b)(2) (1976); Utah Criminal 
Code § 76-3-207. In June of 2004, the State of New York Court of Appeals struck down 
the state’s death penalty statute as unconstitutional due to a problematic jury 
instruction requirement in the penalty phase. 783 N.Y.S.2d 485 (N.Y. 2004). At the 
time of publication, New York State Assembly members remain undecided as to 
whether or not to correct this flaw and reinstate the death penalty. Patrick D. Healy, 
Death Penalty Seems Unlikely to Be Revived, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 2005, at B1.  
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In addition to mental or emotional disturbance, twenty-
eight states—well over half of those jurisdictions that have 
death penalty statutes—give mental illness mitigating impact 
by allowing the jury to consider the defendant’s capacity.68 
These states commonly refer to “the capacity of the defendant 
to appreciate the criminality [or wrongfulness] of his conduct or 
to conform his conduct to the requirements of law” as being 
“impaired” or “significantly” or “substantially impaired.”69 Many 
of these provisions expressly stipulate that this impairment be 
due to “mental disease or defect” or “mental illness.”70 
Connecticut has gone so far as to bar the death penalty when 
such incapacity is found.71 
Death penalty statutes may also implicate severe 
mental illness as a mitigating factor with other language. 
Oregon, for instance, instructs jurors to consider “the extent of 
mental or emotional pressure under which the defendant was 
acting at the time the offense was committed.”72 Illinois, on the 
other hand, looks more broadly at whether the defendant 
  
 68 See ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-703 (2004); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-605 (Michie 
2004); CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.3 (West 2005); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-1.3-1201(4)(b) 
(2003); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-46a (West 2005); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141 (West 
2004); IND. CODE § 35-50-2-9(c)(2) (2005); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4626 (2004); KY. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 532.025 (Banks-Baldwin 2004); LA.CODE CRIM. PROC ANN. art. 905.5 
(West 2005); MD. CODE ANN., CRIMINAL CAUSES § 4-343 (2005); MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-
19-101 (2005); MO. ANN. STAT. § 565.032 (West 2005); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-18-304 
(2005); NEB. REV. ST. § 29-2523 (2005); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 630:5 (2005); N.J. STAT. 
ANN. § 2C:11-3 (West 2004); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-20A-6 (Michie 2004); N.Y. CRIMINAL 
PROCEDURE LAW § 400.27 (McKinney 2004); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(f)(2) (2005); 
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.04 (West 2005); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9711 (2005); S.C. 
CODE ANN. § 16-3-20 (Law. Co-op. 2005); TEX. CODE ANN. § 39-13-204 (2005); UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 76-3-207 (2004); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.4 (Michie 2004); WASH. REV. 
CODE § 10.95.070 (2005); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-102 (Michie 2005).  
 69 See statutes cited supra note 66.  
 70 See ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-605 (3) (2004); CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.3(h) 
(1978); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-50-2-9(c)(6) (2004); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 
905.5(e) (2004); N.J. STAT. ANN. 2C:11-3(i)(5)(d) (2002); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 
2929.04(B)(3) (2002); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-204(j)(8) (2002); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. 
10.95.070. Kentucky and Nebraska specifically refer to the term “mental illness.” KY. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.025 (2)(b)7 (2002); NEB. REV. ST. § 29-2523(2)g) (2004). 
Maryland refers to “mental incapacity” and “mental disorder.” MD. R. CR. PROC. § 4-
343 (4).  
 71 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-46a(h) (2001). The statute states: 
The court shall not impose the sentence of death on the defendant if the jury 
or, if there is no jury, the court finds by a special verdict . . . that at the time 
of the offense . . . the defendant’s mental capacity was significantly impaired 
or the defendant’s ability to conform the defendant’s conduct to the 
requirements of law was significantly impaired but not so impaired in either 
case as to constitute a defense to prosecution.  
Id. This mitigating circumstance is listed separately from that of mental retardation. 
Id. 
 72 OR. REV. STAT. § 163.150(1)(c)(A) (2005) (emphasis added).  
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“suffers from a reduced mental capacity.”73 Finally, South 
Carolina asks jurors to consider the “mentality of the defendant 
at the time of the crime.”74 
The consistent inclusion of a mental illness component 
in death penalty statutes indicates that some degree of mental 
illness falling short of insanity must be weighed during 
sentencing. While the provisions do not explain exactly what is 
meant by “mental disturbance” or impairment of capacity, such 
criteria would surely embrace a person suffering from a severe 
mental disorder.75 This pattern among death penalty statutes of 
considering the defendant’s mental condition and 
corresponding inability to act within the law suggests that a 
majority of legislatures recognize the potential of mental illness 
to mitigate a person’s culpability.76  
B. Views of State Justices, Experts and Religious and 
World Communities 
The codification of mental illness in numerous state 
death penalty statutes reflects agreement amongst 
professional, religious and world communities that defendants 
with severe mental disorders should be excluded from capital 
punishment. While this codification may not be as clearly laid 
out as statutes prohibiting execution of criminal offenders with 
mental retardation, it does appear to indicate “a much broader 
social and professional consensus.”77 Many justices presiding 
over capital cases have cast doubt over the appropriateness of 
  
 73 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/9-1(c)(7) (2004) (emphasis added). 
 74 S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-20(C)(b)(7) (2004) (emphasis added). This factor is 
noted separately from the circumstance of mental retardation. Id. § 16-3-20(C)(b)(10).  
 75 See infra Part IV. 
 76 Judges have certainly understood these statutes to give effect in this 
manner. For example, in vacating an order dismissing a capital defendant’s petition for 
post-conviction relief, a Pennsylvania Supreme Court judge deemed that evidence of a 
defendant’s chronic schizophrenia “would have been sufficient to implicate the mental-
health mitigators, namely that Appellant was under the influence of an extreme 
mental or emotional disturbance, and that his capacity to appreciate the criminality of 
his conduct or conform it to the requirements of the law was substantially impaired.” 
Commonwealth v. Hughes, 2004 WL 3050831, at *37 (Pa. 2004). In another instance, a 
Seventh Circuit judge referred to the Indiana death penalty statute as having two 
mitigating factors “to which mental illness can be relevant” and cited the following 
provisions: “‘was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance when 
the murders were committed’” and “‘the defendant’s capacity to appreciate the 
criminality of the defendant’s conduct or to conform that conduct to the requirements of 
law was substantially impaired as a result of mental disease or defect or of 
intoxication.’” Baird v. David, 388 F.3d 1110, 1115 (7th Cir. 2004) (citing IND. CODE § 
35-502-9(C)(2) (2004)). 
 77 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 316 n.21 (2002). 
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excluding people with severe mental disorders from the death 
penalty. In State v. Scott,78 Justice Pfeifer dissented from the 
majority’s opinion which had affirmed a death sentence for a 
man with schizophrenia.79 Arguing that evolving standards of 
decency prohibited the man’s execution, Pfeifer wrote: 
I cannot get past one simple irrefutable fact: he has chronic, 
undifferentiated schizophrenia, a severe mental illness. Mental 
illness is a medical disease. Every year we learn more about it and 
the way it manifests itself in the mind of the sufferer. At this time, 
we do not and cannot know what is going on in the mind of a person 
with mental illness. As a society, we have always treated those with 
mental illness differently from those without. In the interest of 
human dignity, we must continue to do so.80 
Another justice, dissenting in Corcoran v. State,81 cited 
Atkins to propose that the death penalty should not be imposed 
on an individual with severe mental illness. Acknowledging 
that the defendant in this case who received a death sentence 
did not have mental retardation, Justice Rucker asserted that 
“the underlying rationale for prohibiting executions of the 
mentally retarded is just as compelling for prohibiting 
executions of the seriously mentally ill, namely evolving 
standards of decency.”82 Still another justice, in State v. 
Nelson,83 relied heavily on Atkins in his concurrence.84 
Contending that the defendant’s “irrationalities” lessened her 
culpability, Justice Zazzali opined that “if the culpability of the 
average murderer is insufficient to invoke the death penalty as 
our most extreme sanction, then the lesser culpability of 
Nelson, given her history of mental illness and its connection to 
her crimes, ‘surely does not merit that form of retribution.’”85 
Additionally, a number of justices have questioned the 
imposition of the death penalty on individuals with mental 
illness in other contexts. For example, in December of 2004, 
two former North Carolina Supreme Court justices urged 
Governor Mike Easley to commute the sentence of Charles 
Walker, a death row inmate who suffers from a severe mental 
  
 78 748 N.E.2d 11 (Ohio 2001). 
 79 Id. 
 80 Id. at 20. 
 81 774 N.E.2d 495 (Ind. 2002). 
 82 Id. at 502. 
 83 803 A.2d 1, 47 (N.J. 2002). 
 84 Id. 
 85 Id. (quoting Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 433 (1980)) (Zazzali, J., 
dissenting).  
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disorder.86 “‘To spare Walker’s life and impose a sentence of life 
imprisonment without parole is particularly appropriate,’” 
wrote Exum in a letter to the Governor, “‘because of the role 
Walker’s long-standing mental illness—paranoid schizophrenia 
—played in the proceeding leading to his sentence of death.’”87 
In 2002, a group of twenty-one retired state and federal judges 
in Illinois wrote an open letter to then Governor George Ryan, 
urging him to commute the death sentences to life without 
parole in cases where the fairness and accuracy of the 
conviction or sentence was in doubt.88 They referred to mental 
illness as one of the legitimate bases for granting clemency.89 In 
that same year, United States District Judge William Wayne 
Justice openly criticized the Texas criminal justice system for 
approaching the mentally ill with “a spirit of vengeance.”90 He 
referred to Andrea Yates, a woman diagnosed with 
schizophrenia who had drowned her children, to illustrate one 
who could not be “justly blame[d].”91 The federal judge alluded 
to the notion of moral culpability, stating, “‘If we reject the 
moral necessity to distinguish between those who willingly do 
evil, and those who do dreadful acts on account of unbalanced 
minds, we will do injury to these people.’”92 Other judges, 
despite their affirmation of death sentences, have made critical 
remarks about the outcome of death penalty cases involving 
the severely mentally ill, perhaps hinting at an inconsistency 
between what is considered legally appropriate and what 
punishment they feel a capital defendant morally deserves.93 
Organizations with germane expertise in the realm of 
mental health and religious and world communities agree with 
this sentiment to evaluate criminal offenders with severe 
  
 86 Andrea Weigl, Former Justices Urge Mercy, NEWS & OBSERVER, Nov. 24, 
2004, at B5. See also infra Part V.C.  
 87 Weigl, supra note 86. 
 88 John F. Cirricone et al., An Open Letter from Retired Judges to Governor 
George Ryan (Dec. 1, 2002), available at http://www.law.northwestern.edu/depts/clinic/ 
wrongful/documents/JudgeLet1.pdf (last visited Feb. 2, 2005).  
 89 Id.  
 90 James Kimberly, Justice Defends Mentally Ill/U.S. Judge Chides Texas 
Law’s “Spirit of Vengeance”, HOUSTON CHRON., Sept. 26, 2002, at 29. 
 91 Id. 
 92 Id. 
 93 Fifth Circuit Justice Edith H. Jones apparently expressed frustration 
about Kelsey Patterson’s case and asked, “What are we doing here?” She then 
reportedly said to Assistant Attorney General Gina Bunn, “This is a very sick man.” 
Mike Tolson, Mentally Ill Killer’s Life on the Line, HOUST. CHRON., Aug. 11, 2002, at 
A37. Justice Fortunato Benavides spoke out more strongly, evidently blaming Texas’s 
mental health system for continually discharging Patterson back into the community 
where he eventually committed the two murders. Id. 
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mental disorders in capital sentencing proceedings more like 
offenders with mental retardation. For instance, organizations 
such as the National Alliance for the Mentally Ill, the 
American Psychological Association (APA) and the National 
Mental Health Association (NMHA) have taken an official 
stance against capital punishment as imposed on persons with 
severe mental illness.94 In the same vein, four of the twelve 
religious group amici supporting the petitioner in Atkins 
believe that the death penalty is never a legitimate 
punishment when it is aimed at persons who are more 
“vulnerable” than the average person or who suffer from a 
mental illness or disability.95 Two of the other groups similarly 
emphasized that it is the decreased culpability of people with 
mental retardation that renders the death penalty particularly 
inappropriate for this population.96 These religious amici’s 
concerns about vulnerability and decreased culpability readily 
apply to individuals with severe mental disorders.97 
In addition to American professional and religious 
communities, world communities have expressed strong 
opposition to the execution of people with severe mental 
  
 94 See National Mental Health Association, News Release, NMHA Announces 
Position on Death Penalty (Apr. 3, 2001), available at http://www.nmha.org/ 
newsroom/system/news.vw.cfm?do=vw&rid=276 (last visited Dec. 23, 2004); National 
Alliance for the Mentally Ill, Press Release, No Death Penalty for Persons with Severe 
Mental Illnesses (Jan. 12, 1998), available at http://www.nami.org/Content/ 
ContentGroups/Press_Room1/1998/January_1998/No_Death_Penalty_For_Persons_ 
With_Severe_Mental_Illnesses_hr__i_Statement_By_Laurie_M__Flynn,_Execut.htm 
(last visited Jan. 25, 2005); American Psychiatric Association Online, Resolution on the 
Death Penalty in the United States (Aug. 2001), available at http://www.apa.org/pi/ 
deathpenalty.html?CFID=2646048&CFTOKEN=67528764 (last visited Jan. 25, 2005). 
 95 Brief of Amici Curiae, McCarver v. North Carolina, 533 U.S. 975 (2000), 
available at http://www.usccb.org/ogc/amicuscuriae3.shtml (last visited Jan. 25, 2005). 
The General Board of Church and Society and the General Board of Global Ministries 
of the United Methodist Church specifically call on society to “protect the civil rights of 
persons with disabilities” and refer to the “the well-established principle that 
diminished mental capacity also reduces moral culpability.” The General Synod of The 
United Church of Christ reports “an immediate focus on ending the execution of 
juvenile offenders and persons with mental retardation or mental illness.” Clifton 
Kirkpatrick, as Stated Clerk of the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church, 
U.S.A., indicates that “those who are ‘most vulnerable, most likely to be forgotten, 
exploited or oppressed, most unable to defend’” are entitled to “special protection.” The 
Mennonite Central Committee, U.S. Washington Office emphasizes “God’s special 
concern for those who are weak, neglected and vulnerable.” Id. (emphasis added). 
 96 Id. (emphasis added). The Evangelical Lutheran Church in America 
“believes the execution of persons with mental retardation is particularly inappropriate 
because of their diminished culpability,” while the Foundation for the Preservation of 
the Mahayana Tradition, Inc. believes that because people with mental retardation are 
“less culpable than would otherwise be the case . . . it behooves us to treat these 
individuals with care and compassion.” Id. 
 97 See discussion infra Part IV. C. 
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disorders. The European Union (EU), whose brief the Court 
cited in Atkins when noting that the world community 
“overwhelmingly disapprove[s]” of capital punishment for 
individuals with mental retardation,98 has specifically spoken 
out against inflicting the death penalty on any person with a 
serious mental illness.99 In a letter written to urge the 
commutation of Kelsey Patterson’s death sentence, 
representatives of the EU Presidency stated, “The EU strongly 
believes that the execution of persons suffering from a mental 
disorder is contrary to widely accepted human rights norms 
and in contradiction to the minimum standards of human 
rights set forth in several international human rights 
instruments.”100 This view reflects that of the Office of the 
United Nations Commission for Human Rights (OHCHR).101 
The provisions of the OHCHR Resolution 2002/77 urge that all 
non-abolitionist States refrain from imposing the death penalty 
“on a person suffering from any form of mental disorder or to 
execute any such person.”102 Certainly “any form of mental 
disorder” includes severe mental illness.103 
While international communities tend to oppose capital 
punishment in general and for individuals with mental 
disorders in particular,104 national polls suggest that the United 
States public also opposes the death penalty for individuals 
  
 98 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 316 n.21 (2002). 
 99 European Union, Delegation of the European Commission to the United 
States, EU Policy on the Death Penalty, Letter to Governor of Georgia (Feb. 2002), 
available at http://www.eurunion.org/legislat/DeathPenalty/WilliamsGAGovLett.htm 
(last visited Dec. 23, 2004). The EU is a treaty-based international organization 
comprised of fifteen countries working towards forging strong ties between European 
peoples. Id. 
 100 Letter from European Union to Governor of Texas (April 26, 2004), 
available at http://www.internationaljusticeproject.org/pdfs/DEMAR1APatterson.pdf 
(last visited on Jan. 3, 2005).  
 101 The OHCHR is composed of 53 member states spanning several continents 
that strive to defend human rights and promote implementation of agreed upon 
international standards. See UNITED NATIONS CYBER SCHOOL BUS, Human Rights and 
the United Nations, available at http://www.un.org/cyberschoolbus/humanrights/ 
about/history.asp (last visited March 26, 2005). See also OFFICE OF THE UNITED 
NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, Brochure, Preface, available at 
http://www.unhchr.ch/html/enu6//OHCHR.pdf (last visited Feb. 27, 2005). 
 102 UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, The Question 
of the Death Penalty, Commission on Human Rights Resolution 2002/77, available at 
http://www.unhchr.ch/Huridocda/Huridoca.nsf/TestFrame/e93443efabf7a6c4c1256bab0
0500ef6?Opendocument (last visited Dec. 23, 2004). 
 103 See discussion supra Part III.B. 
 104 Id. See also EUROPEAN UNION IN THE US, EU Memorandum on the Death 
Penalty, available at http://www.eurunion.org/legislat/deathpenalty/eumemorandum. 
htm (last visited Dec. 23, 2004).  
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with severe mental disorders. Varying reports on a Gallup Poll 
conducted in May of 2002 found that when asked whether they 
favored or opposed the death penalty for “the mentally ill,” 
between seventy-three and seventy-five percent of Americans 
responded that they opposed it.105 This number approaches the 
eighty-two percent of respondents who said they opposed the 
death penalty for “the mentally retarded.”106 Additionally, in the 
appendix to Chief Justice Rehnquist’s opinion in Atkins, poll 
results showed that 63.8% of Americans nationwide do not 
support execution of the “mentally impaired.”107 Although the 
Court interpreted the term “mentally impaired” to refer to the 
mentally retarded, there is nothing to indicate that the poll 
respondents excluded the severely mentally ill from 
consideration. While the terms “mentally ill” and “mentally 
impaired” may seem undefined, individuals with severe mental 
disorders undeniably fit within either description. Thus, the 
polling data strongly suggests that a significant segment of the 
United States disapproves of executing the mentally ill, a 
population that would encompass at the very least those 
persons with severe mental disorders. These national polls, 
combined with state statutes, court opinions, and the views of 
world communities, reveal an overwhelming consensus 
opposing imposition of capital punishment on defendants with 
severe mental disorders.  
 
IV. SEVERE MENTAL ILLNESS AND ITS IMPACT ON THE 
DEFENDANT: A COMPARISON WITH THE DECREASED 
CULPABILITY AND VULNERABILITIES OF DEFENDANTS 
WITH MENTAL RETARDATION 
A. Criteria for Mental Illness in General 
Severe mental disorders comprise a narrow category 
under the catch-all mental illness grouping and can arguably 
be characterized as involving impaired mental functioning.108 
  
 105 See DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION CENTER, Summaries of Recent Poll 
Findings, National Polls, available at http://deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?scid= 
23&did=210#Gallup3/30/00 (last visited Dec. 23, 2004). See also Death Penalty, The 
Gallup Poll, available at http://www.pollingreport.com/crime.htm (last visited Dec. 23, 
2004).  
 106 See Death Penalty Information Center, supra note 105; Gallup Poll, supra 
note 105.  
 107 Atkins, 536 U.S. at Appendix to Opinion of Rehnquist, C.J. (2002). 
 108 See discussion infra Part IV.A. 
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Mental illness itself is generally thought of as encompassing 
distinct categories of mental disorders marked by impairment 
in cognition, mood, and behavior stemming from abnormal 
brain function.109 People diagnosed with these disorders 
experience symptoms that vary in degree of severity, duration, 
and disturbance of daily performance.110 As with other medical 
illnesses, these symptoms lie on a continuum.111 At one end, the 
less severe disorders respond to outpatient psychotherapy and 
medication monitoring.112 At the other end, severe mental 
disorders involve gross functional impairment and psychosis 
which often incapacitate the individual to the point that 
hospitalization is required.113  
B. Severe Mental Illness, Prognosis and Lack of Insight 
Severe mental illness is usually restricted to categories 
of schizophrenia, schizoaffective disorder and bipolar disorder 
(i.e. manic depression).114 The symptoms associated with these 
disorders, such as hallucinations and delusions, are principally 
treated with antipsychotic medication115 and increase the need 
  
 109 OFFICE OF THE SURGEON GENERAL, MENTAL HEALTH: A REPORT OF THE 
SURGEON GENERAL, CH. 2, THE FUNDAMENTALS OF MENTAL HEALTH AND MENTAL 
ILLNESS, OVERVIEW OF MENTAL ILLNESS 39 (1999), available at http://www.surgeon 
general.gov/library/mentalhealth/chapter2/sec2.html (last visited Feb. 2, 2005) 
[hereinafter FUNDAMENTALS]. 
 110 Id.  
 111 Id. 
 112 Id. at 65-70. 
 113 See AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DEFINITION OF SEVERE MENTAL 
ILLNESS, at http://www.psych.org/aids/modules/illness/sld005.htm (last visited Dec. 23, 
2004). See also TREATMENT ADVOCACY CENTER, FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS, FAQ: 
SEVERE MENTAL ILLNESS, available at http://www.psychlaws.org/PressRoom/ 
presskits/AboutTACPressKit/abouttacdoc2.htm#AA_SMI (last visited March 20, 2005) 
[hereinafter FAQ]. 
 114 FAQ, supra note 113. For a description of schizophrenia see discussion 
infra Part IV. C.1. Bipolar disorder is an illness causing fluctuations in mood and is 
characterized by depressive and/or manic episodes. DSM-IV, supra note 53, at 350-51. 
A manic episode may entail grandiose ideas, decreased sleep, rapid speech, tangential 
thinking, and excessive, impulsive behavior, and is often accompanied by psychotic 
symptoms. Id. A depressive episode is marked by depressed mood throughout the day, 
apathy, sleep and appetite disturbances, restlessness or loss of energy, distractibility, 
feelings of worthlessness, and suicidal thoughts. Id. at 327. Individuals diagnosed with 
schizoaffective disorder exhibit symptoms of both schizophrenia and a mood disorder. 
Id. at 292. See generally A. Benabarre et al., Bipolar Disorder, Schizoaffective Disorder 
and Schizophrenia: Epidemiologic, Clinical and Prognostic Differences, 16 EUR. 
PSYCHIATRY, 167 (2001).  
 115 See also NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF MENTAL HEALTH (NIMH), Schizophrenia, 
at 13-15, available at http://www.nimh.nih.gov/publicat/schizoph.pdf (last visited Jan. 
28, 2005) [hereinafter NIMH]. 
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for hospitalization during acute episodes.116 Like mental 
retardation, these conditions are not “curable,” although they 
may be treatable with medication.117 Because there are several 
types of severe mental disorders with variations in symptoms, 
there is no definite course of illness.118 For instance, while 
advocates and practitioners remain optimistic, statistics reveal 
that about half the people diagnosed with schizophrenia will 
experience only modest improvement, no improvement, or 
death.119 Even taking their medications, about a third will 
relapse within a one year time period.120  
A person with severe mental illness may be 
unsuccessful in seeking treatment or following through with 
medication management due to lack of awareness or “insight” 
caused by irregularities in brain function.121 This deficiency is 
commonly found in both patients with schizophrenia and 
patients with bipolar disorder.122 When a person lacks insight, 
he or she does not have the ability to realize that he or she is 
sick.123 Therefore, when psychotic symptoms cause afflicted 
  
 116 AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, Public Information, Schizophrenia, 
available at http://www.psych. rg/public_info/chizo.cfm (last visited Jan. 25, 2005) 
[hereinafter Schizophrenia]. The APA reports that “Schizophrenia fills more hospital 
beds than almost any other illness, and Federal figures reflect the cost of schizophrenia 
to be from $30 billion to $48 billion in direct medical costs, lost productivity and Social 
Security pensions.” Id. at 4. 
 117 FAQ, supra note 113. See also NIMH, supra note 115, at 13. 
 118 OFFICE OF THE SURGEON GENERAL, MENTAL HEALTH: A REPORT OF THE 
SURGEON GENERAL, CH. 4, ADULTS AND MENTAL HEALTH, SCHIZOPHRENIA, COURSE AND 
RECOVERY, at 274 (1999), available at http://www.surgeongeneral.gov/library/ 
entalhealth/chapter4/sec4_1.html (last visited Dec. 23, 2004) (“Most individuals 
experience periods of symptom exacerbation and remission, while others maintain a 
steady level of symptoms and disability which can range from moderate to severe.”). Id. 
 119 FAQ, supra note 113. See also SURGEON GENERAL, SCHIZOPHRENIA, 
COURSE AND RECOVERY, supra note 118, at 274 (“Most do not return to their prior state 
of mental function.”). The course of illness is influenced by factors such as the 
individual’s biological vulnerabilities, personal motivation, family or other social 
support, and socioeconomic status. Id.  
 120 FAQ, supra note 113. 
 121 See Stefano Pallanti, et al., Awareness of Illness and Subjective Experience 
of Cognitive Complaints in Patients with Bipolar I and Bipolar II Disorder, 156 AM. J. 
PSYCHIATRY 1094 (July 1999). “Poor awareness of one’s own mental illness is an 
established feature in schizophrenia.” Celso Arango, et al., Relationship of Awareness 
of Dyskinesia in Schizophrenia to Insight into Mental Illness, 156 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 
1097 (July 1999). The medical term for lack of insight is “anosognosia,” which literally 
means “to not know a disease.” TREATMENT ADVOCACY CENTER, Briefing Paper, 
Impaired Awareness of Illness (Anosognosia): A Major Problem for Individuals with 
Schizophrenia and Bipolar Disorder, available at http://www.psychlaws.org/ 
BriefingPapers/BP14.htm (last visited Dec. 23, 2004). 
 122 See Pallanti, supra note 121, at 1094. See also Arango, supra note 121, at 
1097. 
 123 TREATMENT ADVOCACY CENTER, MEDICAL RESOURCES, INSIGHT, available 
at http://www.psychlaws.org/MedicalResources/index.htm (last visited Dec. 23, 2004). 
 2/22/2005 6:19:12 PM 
1014 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 70:3 
persons to erroneously think “that a neighbor is controlling 
their behavior with magnetic waves; that people on television 
are directing special messages to them; or that their thoughts 
are being broadcast aloud to others,” those persons believe such 
thoughts to be based in reality.124 
Lack of insight differs from denial of one’s illness in that 
the former is caused by actual damage to the right hemisphere 
of the brain.125 Research indicates that “approximately half of 
all patients with schizophrenia and mania have markedly 
impaired awareness of their illness as measured by tests of 
insight.”126 In some ways, lack of insight renders people with 
schizophrenia comparable to patients who have experienced a 
stroke or who suffer from Alzheimer's disease.127 Such 
individuals consistently refuse to take medication because they 
do not believe they are sick. In most cases they will take 
medication only under some form of assisted treatment.128 
Apart from lack of insight, patients stop complying with 
treatment because of uncomfortable side effects, barriers to 
treatment, misguided advice to discontinue medications when 
the person seems to have improved, and disordered thinking 
which causes the person to forget to take medications,.129 The 
inability or refusal to comply with treatment tends to lead to 
exacerbation of symptoms and coinciding disturbances in 
behavior.130 These disturbances can be manifested by 
psychiatric hospitalization, suicide attempts, homelessness, 
incarceration, and violent acts.131  
Although non-adherence to treatment increases the risk 
of relapse into acute illness, lay persons frequently do not 
understand that individuals with severe mental disorders may 
experience a recurrence of psychosis even when compliant with 
medications.132 This reality is especially important to consider 
when gauging a defendant’s culpability, where jurors might 
  
 124 NIMH, supra note 115, at 5-6. 
 125 See TREATMENT ADVOCACY CENTER, supra note 123. 
 126 Id.  
 127 Id. 
 128 Id. 
 129 See Diana O. Perkins, Predictors of Noncompliance in Patients with 
Schizophrenia, 63 J. CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY 1121, 1123 (Dec. 2002). See also NIMH, 
supra note 115, at 16. 
 130 NIMH, supra note 115, at 7, 9; FAQ, supra note 113.  
 131 TREATMENT ADVOCACY CENTER, supra note 123. 
 132 NIMH, supra note 115, at 15. 
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erroneously believe that a person has both insight into and 
control over his or her illness.133 
Severe mental disorders have a clear detrimental 
impact on cognition and function, with relatively poor 
prognosis for the individual. Therefore, courts should recognize 
that such illness affects the criminal offender’s moral 
culpability and susceptibility to disadvantage in legal 
proceedings, just as the Supreme Court acknowledged the 
impact of subaverage intelligence on death row inmates with 
mental retardation. 
C. A Comparison of the Impact of the Severe Mental 
Disorder of Schizophrenia with the Impact of Mental 
Retardation on the Defendant  
In order to compare the impact of mental retardation on 
capital defendants with the impact of severe mental illness on 
the offender, it may be helpful to address their commonalities 
by way of example. These next four sections will thus discuss 
the range of impairment that individuals with schizophrenia 
experience and the effects that psychological and functional 
deficiencies have on their moral culpability and vulnerability in 
legal proceedings. 
1. Schizophrenia as a severe mental disorder by 
which to compare mental retardation 
A person with schizophrenia tends to continually 
experience either positive or negative symptoms and at 
baseline might only be able to minimally care for his or her 
needs.134 Positive symptoms involve an exaggeration or 
distortion of normal consciousness,135 while negative symptoms 
involve blunted personality and emotions, impoverished 
thinking, and inability to act in a goal-directed manner.136 
  
 133 See Christopher Slobogin, Mental Illness and the Death Penalty, 24 MENT. 
PHYS. DIS. L. REP. 667, 670 (2000) (citing a study involving mock jurors who reasoned 
that “‘mental illness is no excuse . . . he should have sought help for his problems.’”). 
 134 “Complete remission (i.e., a return to full premorbid functioning) is 
probably not common in this disorder. Of those who remain ill, some appear to have a 
relatively stable course, whereas others show a progressive worsening associated with 
severe disability.” DSM-IV, supra note 53, at 282. 
 135 Id. at 53, at 274-75; FUNDAMENTALS, supra note 109.  
 136 JOURNAL OF CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY, Academic Proceedings Monograph, II. 
Negative Symptoms in Schizophrenia, 16 J. CLIN. PSYCH. MONOGRAPH 9 (Feb. 1998). 
People with negative symptoms appear to have “a diminution of thoughts that is 
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People with psychotic disorders like schizophrenia frequently 
have disturbed thought processes.137 Because of these 
limitations in functioning and thinking, people with 
schizophrenia logically provide a group with which to compare 
individuals with mental retardation. 
While there are different types of schizophrenia, each 
form must have at least two of the following symptoms: 
delusions; hallucinations; disorganized speech; disorganized or 
catatonic behavior; or negative symptoms.138 A person must also 
experience a demonstrably lower level of social and 
occupational functioning.139 None of these features can be 
caused by substance abuse or another medical condition.140 
While a diagnosis of schizophrenia requires manifest psychotic 
symptoms for at lease one month, signs of the disturbance 
overall must last at least six months.141  
Schizophrenia as a rule and mental retardation in 
general involve known biological components. Scientific 
research supports the theory that certain individuals have a 
genetic predisposition to schizophrenia, that certain parts of 
the brain in these people are structurally abnormal, that 
excessive levels of certain chemicals are present in particular 
brain pathways, and that these conditions combine with 
environmental stressors to produce this disorder.142 According to 
the Centers for Disease Control and prevention, mental 
retardation can be caused by defects in chromosomes, brain 
  
reflected in decreased fluency and productivity of speech. This must be differentiated 
from an unwillingness to speak . . . .” DSM-IV, supra note 53, at 277.  
 137 SURGEON GENERAL, Schizophrenia, supra note 118. 
 138 DSM-IV, supra note 53, at 285. If one of these symptoms is particularly 
pronounced, for example, the individual has auditory hallucinations in which he or she 
hears two or more voices carrying on a conversation, then only one symptom is 
required. Id. at 285. 
 139 Id. 
 140 Id. at 286. 
 141 DSM-IV, supra note 53, at 285. 
 142 See Jae-Jin Kim et al., Regional Neural Dysfunctions in Chronic 
Schizophrenia Studied with Positron Emission Tomography, 157 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 
542 (Apr. 2000); James J. Levitt, et al., Quantitative Volumetric MRI Study of the 
Cerebellum and Vermis in Schizophrenia: Clinical and Cognitive Correlates, 156 AM. J. 
PSYCHIATRY 1105 (July 1999); Brendan McDonald et al., Anomalous Asymmetry of 
Fusiform and Parahippocampal Gyrus Gray Matter in Schizophrenia: A Postmortem 
Study, 157 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 40 (Jan. 2000); Kai Vogeley et al., Disturbed Gyrification 
of the Prefrontal Region in Male Schizophrenic Patients: A Morphometric Postmortem 
Study, 157 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 34 (July 2000). See also OFFICE OF THE SURGEON 
GENERAL, MENTAL HEALTH: A REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL, CH. 4, ADULTS AND 
MENTAL HEALTH, ETIOLOGY OF SCHIZOPHRENIA, at 276 (1999), available at 
http://www.surgeongeneral.gov/library/ mentalhealth/chapter4/sec4_1.html#etiology 
(last visited Dec. 23, 2004).  
 2/22/2005 6:19:12 PM 
2005] APPLYING ATKINS V. VIRGINA TO CAPITAL DEFENDANTS 1017 
abnormalities, stroke, or childhood infections.143 It can also be 
caused by complications at birth such as lack of oxygen to the 
baby’s brain.144 Additionally, the mother’s compromised health 
and environmental factors might create biological conditions 
that place the fetus, baby or child at risk for mental 
retardation. For instance, mental retardation might result from 
a pregnant woman who is chemically addicted, malnourished, 
or prescribed certain medications.145 It may also result from 
abuse of the child or head injury.146 
The etiologies of schizophrenia and mental retardation 
differ in that on the one hand, a first psychotic episode related 
to schizophrenia generally occurs in the early to mid-twenties 
for males, the later twenties for females.147 In contrast, mental 
retardation can arise in infancy and must generally be present 
before a child turns 18 years old.148 Yet whether caused by 
genetic factors alone or influenced by the environment, both 
schizophrenia and mental retardation involve conditions which 
indicate that the brain has been affected in a way that 
produces significant vulnerabilities in the individual.  
2. Decreased moral culpability in criminal offenders 
with schizophrenia 
Although people with schizophrenia might not be of 
subaverage intelligence as are people with mental retardation, 
many people with schizophrenia actively experience cognitive 
disturbances.149 These problems can include difficulties in: 
remembering, orienting oneself to time and place, 
concentrating, processing information, and thinking abstractly 
or in a goal-directed way.150 As a result, people with 
schizophrenia often exhibit behavior marked by impulsiveness 
  
 143 CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, NATIONAL CENTER ON 
BIRTH DEFECTS AND DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES, MENTAL RETARDATION, available 
at http://www.cdc.gov/ncbddd/dd/ddmr.htm (last visited Dec. 23, 2004). 
 144 Id. 
 145 Id. 
 146 Id. 
 147 DSM-IV, supra note 53, at 282. 
 148 Id. at 44. 
 149 See DSM-IV, supra note 53, at 274; OFFICE OF THE SURGEON GENERAL, 
MENTAL HEALTH: A REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL, CH. 4, ADULTS AND MENTAL 
HEALTH, SCHIZOPHRENIA, OVERVIEW, (1999), available at http://www.surgeongeneral. 
gov/library/mentalhealth/chapter4/sec4_1.html#etiology (last visited Dec. 23, 2004) 
[hereinafter Adults and Mental Health]. 
 150 Id. See also DSM-IV, supra note 53, at 279. 
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and “chaotic or imprecise planning.”151 These disturbances could 
exist in addition to psychotic symptoms that might distort the 
person’s perception of reality and cause illogical thinking.152 For 
instance: 
[P]atients suffering from paranoid-type symptoms—roughly one-
third of people with schizophrenia—often have delusions of 
persecution, or false and irrational beliefs that they are being 
cheated, harassed, poisoned, or conspired against. These patients 
may believe that they, or a member of the family or someone close to 
them, are the focus of this persecution.153 
Such thought disorders diminish the culpability of defendants 
with schizophrenia just as do the cognitive limitations of 
defendants with mental retardation.  
People with schizophrenia similarly are not necessarily 
found to be more likely to engage in violence than others.154 
Studies that formerly found a link between violence and 
disorders such as schizophrenia have since become 
controversial, if not outdated.155 Researchers have asserted that 
“Mental disorders—in sharp contrast to alcohol and drug 
abuse—account for a miniscule portion of the violence that 
afflicts American society.”156 The only segment of the population 
  
 151 See Gerard E. Hogarty et al., Cognitive Enhancement Therapy for 
Schizophrenia, Effects of a 2-Year Randomized Trial on Cognition and Behavior, 61 
ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY, 866, tbl. 1 (Sept. 2004). See also infra Part IV.C.3. 
 152 Schizoprhenia, supra note 116. 
 153 NIMH, supra note 115, at 5. 
 154 While the Court in Atkins referred to the likelihood of people with mental 
retardation to engage in “crime” in general, medical research of individuals with severe 
mental disorders tends to focus specifically on violence. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 
350-51 (2002). Thus, the following discussion of research findings pertains only to 
violence.  
 155 Cameron Wallace et al., Criminal Offending in Schizophrenia Over a 25-
Year Period Marked by Deinstitutionalization and Increasing Prevalence of Comorbid 
Substance Use Disorders, 161 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 716 (2004). A noteworthy British 
national clinical survey found that “There [were] substantial rates of mental disorder 
in people convicted of homicide. Most [did] not have severe mental illness or a history 
of contact with mental health services.” Jenny Shaw et al., Mental Disorder and 
Clinical Care in People Convicted of Homicide: National Clinical Survey, 318 BRIT. 
MED. J. 1240 (May 8, 1999). Some studies have also found that offenders with 
schizophrenia are less likely to reoffend than offenders without schizophrenia, given 
the same opportunity. Marnie E. Rice & Grant T. Harris, The Treatment of Mentally 
Disordered Offenders, 3 PSYCH. PUB. POL. L. 126, 131 (1997). Another study found that 
“in the combined sample of offenders as well as among the insanity acquittees alone, 
recidivism rates (both general and violent) were lower for those diagnosed as psychotic 
than for nonpsychotic offenders.” Id.  
 156 John W. Parry, Criminal Mental Health Jurisprudence, 24 MENTAL & 
PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 538, 542 (2000) (citing John Monahan & J. Arnold, 
Violence by People with Mental Illness: A Consensus Statement by Advocates and 
Researchers, 19 PSYCHIATRIC REHABILITATION J. 67 (1996)).  
 2/22/2005 6:19:12 PM 
2005] APPLYING ATKINS V. VIRGINA TO CAPITAL DEFENDANTS 1019 
with schizophrenia that seems to definitively demonstrate a 
strong correlation with increased violence is that which abuses 
substances.157 These findings comport with the 
acknowledgement that individuals with severe mental 
disorders who receive sufficient treatment are no more 
dangerous than the general population.158  
In addition to cognitive disturbances and the finding 
that “the total amount of violence in society attributable to 
psychotic patients is small,”159 individuals with schizophrenia 
also share with persons with mental retardation difficulties 
  
 157 These substances range from alcohol and marijuana to stimulants and 
sedatives. Michael Soyka, Substance Misuse, Psychiatric Disorder and Violent and 
Disturbed Behaviour, 176 BRIT. J. PSYCHIATRY 345 (April 2000). 
 158 APA Fact Sheet, Violence and Mental Illness, at 3 (Jan. 1998), available at 
http://www.psych.org/public_info/violence.pdf (last visited Jan. 30, 2005) [hereinafter 
Violence]. See also Treatment Advocacy Center, Consequences of Lack of Treatment, Are 
People with Mental Illness Dangerous?, available at http://www.psychlaws.org/ 
PressRoom/presskits/abouttacdoc2.htm#lot_danger (last visited Feb. 24, 2005). Studies 
have shown that persons diagnosed with schizophrenia, bipolar disorder and other 
mood disorders were more likely than persons without a mental disorder to report 
having been violent within a specific time frame and that this behavior was related to 
the presence of psychotic symptoms. Rice & Harris, supra note 155, at 130. However, 
persons with substance abuse disorders had a greater likelihood of engaging in violence 
or other criminal behavior than persons with severe mental disorders. Id. at 130-31. 
The American Psychiatric Association points out that the factors associated with 
increased risk for violence are the same for those persons with mental illness as for 
those persons without such a diagnosis. AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, Violence 
and Mental Illness, Conditions that Increase the Risk of Violence, available at 
http://www.psych.org/public_info/VIOLEN~1.cfm (last visited Feb. 24, 2005). These 
factors include: history of violence among family members; lack of family or community 
support; stressful, chaotic living situation; and exposure to an environment in which 
substance abuse is common. Id. One body of research asserts that there is a significant 
correlation between schizophrenia and violence. However, some researchers qualify 
this finding by stating that: 
[N]o sizeable body of evidence clearly indicates the relative strength of 
schizophrenia or mental illness in general as a risk factor for violence 
compared with other risk factors. Indeed, compared with the magnitude of 
risk associated with the combination of male gender, young age and lower 
socio-economic status, the risk of violence presented by mental disorder is 
modest. 
Elizabeth Walsh et al., Violence and Schizophrenia: Examining the Evidence, 180 BRIT. 
J. PSYCHIATRY 490 (2002) (citations omitted). Furthermore, the evidence points to 
substance abuse and psychotic symptoms as being factors distinguishing people with 
schizophrenia who are at increased risk for violence. Id. Such findings are again 
consistent with the understanding that untreated individuals with schizophrenia and 
or those who abuse substances are more prone to violence.  
 159 Dale E. McNiel, Correlates of Violence in Psychotic Patients, 27 
PSYCHIATRIC ANNALS 683, 684 (1997). McNiel refers to a study which later concluded: 
[M]ajor mental disorder is a statistically significant but modest risk factor for 
violence . . . . [T]he total amount of violence in society attributable to 
psychotic patients is small (in part because serious mental illness itself is 
rare), and that the level of risk posed by psychotic disorders is much less than 
that of substance use. 
Id. 
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functioning in major life areas. Essential to a diagnosis of 
schizophrenia are social and occupational dysfunction in which 
“one or more major areas of functioning such as work, 
interpersonal relations, or self-care are markedly below the 
level achieved prior to the onset. . . .”160 Individuals so diagnosed 
frequently suffer from “unemployment, disrupted education, 
limited social relationships, isolation, legal involvement, family 
stress, and substance abuse.”161 These elements of 
schizophrenia are analogous to the adaptive behavior deficits 
that form part of the definition of mental retardation. A person 
with mental retardation is limited in the level of academic 
skills that he or she can acquire and may or may not be able to 
develop the social and vocational skills necessary to be self-
sufficient, depending on the level of mental retardation.162 
When individuals with schizophrenia suffer an acute 
phase, their level of functioning becomes more comparable to 
that of people with moderate to severe mental retardation. 
Although the conditions take on noticeably different 
appearances, the capacity of either population to communicate, 
think coherently and behave appropriately is similarly 
substantially impaired. The psychotic symptoms tend to 
influence the person to behave bizarrely, become agitated, and 
speak nonsense.163 He or she might also be unable to bathe and 
dress appropriately.164 Individuals with schizophrenia who lack 
awareness of their illness also typically do not take their 
medications.165  
In sum, offenders with severe mental illness, although 
not intellectually impaired, suffer from cognitive and 
behavioral impairments analogous to the deficiencies 
experienced by defendants with mental retardation found less 
culpable in Atkins. 
3. Individuals with schizophrenia and the penal 
justifications for the death penalty. 
In keeping with the Atkins Court rationale, the two 
penal goals of retribution and deterrence are not furthered by 
  
 160 DSM-IV, supra note 53, at 285. 
 161 FUNDAMENTALS, supra note 109. 
 162 DSM-IV, supra note 53, at 41. 
 163 Id. at 276.  
 164 Schizoprhenia, supra note 116, at 276. 
 165 See text accompanying footnotes 122, 124.  
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the execution of individuals with severe mental illness. In 
Atkins, the Court weighed heavily the concern that: 
[I]t is the same cognitive and behavioral impairments that make 
these [defendants with mental retardation] less morally culpable— 
for example, the diminished ability to understand and process 
information, to learn from experience, to engage in logical reasoning, 
or to control impulses—that also make it less likely that they can 
process the information of the possibility of execution as a penalty 
and, as a result, control their conduct based upon that information.166 
Likewise, the Court should consider that the 
deficiencies suffered by defendants with schizophrenia that 
render them less culpable also impede their ability to refrain 
from conduct based on a possible penalty of death. Indeed, 
recent research has found that “[p]atients with schizophrenia 
who commit violent acts have insight deficits, including lack of 
awareness of the legal implications of their behavior.”167  
The failure to make the critical connection between 
conduct and legal consequences directly affects the capacity of 
the defendant with schizophrenia to be deterred. Whereas 
someone with mental retardation might not refrain from 
committing an offense because his or her intellectual 
functioning does not allow that person to see beyond the act to 
the possibility of penalty, the individual with schizophrenia 
might also not refrain from committing an offense because of 
cognitive dysfunction or firmly held erroneous beliefs that lead 
the defendant to think that he or she is acting in accordance 
with reality.168  
Justice is also not advanced in terms of retribution, 
because a person with schizophrenia who commits a capital 
crime is less morally culpable than a person without 
schizophrenia.169 Retribution entails punishing the offender in 
proportion to his or her culpability.170 The Supreme Court has 
asserted that “[i]f the culpability of the average murderer is 
insufficient to justify the most extreme sanction available to 
the State, the lesser culpability of the mentally retarded 
offender surely does not merit that form of retribution.”171 
Accordingly, the death penalty is certainly a disproportionate 
  
 166 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 320 (2002). 
 167 Peter F. Buckley et al., Insight and Its Relationship to Violent Behavior in 
Patients with Schizophrenia, 161 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1712 (2004).  
 168 See Violence, supra note 158, at 2. See also DSM-IV, supra note 53, at 275.  
 169 See discussion supra Part IV.C.3. 
 170 Atkins, 536 U.S. at 319. 
 171 Id. 
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punishment to inflict on an offender with schizophrenia, who 
by definition has experienced “profound disruption in cognition 
and emotion, affecting the most fundamental human 
attributes: language, thought, perception, affect, and sense of 
self.”172 
4. Disadvantages in criminal proceedings 
associated with severe mental illnesses such as 
schizophrenia 
Apart from the limited applicability of the normal penal 
justifications, greater potential for vulnerabilities in legal 
proceedings present disadvantages to severely mentally ill 
defendants that are similar to those faced by defendants with 
mental retardation. One attorney’s statement that “[i]f the 
defendant knows he is in a courtroom and can tell the 
difference between a judge and a grapefruit, he is deemed 
competent to stand trial,” albeit hyperbolic, alludes to the 
concern that defendants who are mentally ill are assessed as 
competent by low standards and are therefore often 
inappropriately propelled into court.173 Defendants may 
understand the role that each person plays in the legal process, 
but because of delusions or impaired judgment, may distrust or 
refuse to cooperate with defense counsel, or believe that a 
defense is somehow unnecessary.174 
Like persons with mental retardation, defendants with 
schizophrenia might still be found competent to stand trial. 
Their symptoms do not necessarily sever them completely from 
reality.175 They might be aware, for example, that “people eat 
three times a day, sleep at night and use the streets for driving 
vehicles. For that reason, their behavior may appear quite 
  
 172 FUNDAMENTALS, supra note 109, at 269. 
 173 Ronald L. Kuby & William M. Kunstler, So Crazy He Thinks He Is Sane: 
The Colin Ferguson Trial and the Competency Standard, 5 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 
19, 25 (1995). 
 174 See Press Release, American Civil Liberties Union, ACLU Opposes Death 
Sentence for Mentally Ill Inmate, First Ohio Execution in 35 Years (Feb. 11, 1999), 
available at http://www.aclu.org/news/NewsPrint.cfm?ID=8403&c=17 (last visited Jan. 
24, 2004). See also Martin Sabelli & Stacey Leyton, Train Wrecks and Freeway 
Crashes: An Argument for Fairness and Against Self Representation in the Criminal 
Justice System, 91 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 161, 185-86 (2000). Situations in which 
severely mentally ill defendants insist on self representation and refuse mental illness 
defenses raise the issue of whether assistance of counsel should be mandatory to serve 
the defendants’ best interests in capital cases. Id. at 186, 197-98. 
 175 Schizophrenia, supra note 116. 
 2/22/2005 6:19:12 PM 
2005] APPLYING ATKINS V. VIRGINA TO CAPITAL DEFENDANTS 1023 
normal much of the time.”176 On the other hand, once inside the 
courtroom, people with schizophrenia may not be able to keep 
up the appearance of normalcy because of their outward 
responses to underlying symptoms. As in the case of an 
individual with mental retardation, a defendant with 
schizophrenia might also be a poor witness whose demeanor 
“may create an unwarranted impression of lack of remorse.”177 
Because a schizophrenic individual tends to “not show the signs 
of normal emotion, perhaps may speak in a monotonous voice, 
have diminished facial expressions, and appear extremely 
apathetic,”178 his or her appearance in the courtroom might 
have a similar adverse effect on the jury. 
Perhaps most significantly, just as with mental 
retardation, severe mental illness “as a mitigating factor can be 
a two-edged sword that may enhance the likelihood that the 
aggravating factor of future dangerousness will be found by the 
jury.”179 While most death penalty statute provisions create the 
potential for severe mental illness to be a mitigating factor,180 
studies have demonstrated that the factfinder often treats such 
illness as an aggravator.181 For example, research into 128 
Georgia capital cases in 1990 revealed that an unsuccessful 
insanity defense strongly correlated with a sentence of death.182 
Given that defendants who raise the insanity defense generally 
present evidence of mental illness,183 this correlation suggests 
that juries and judges may be influenced to impose the death 
penalty even when mitigating evidence exists. This result is 
not necessarily inconsistent with a finding of lesser culpability 
in a severely mentally ill offender.184 Though studies using mock 
jurors offer a range of theories to explain why the insanity 
defense may fail for the afflicted defendant,185 it is the jurors’ 
  
 176 Id. (emphasis added). 
 177 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 320-21 (2002). 
 178 NIMH, supra note 115, at 6. 
 179 Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321. 
 180 See discussion supra Part IV.A. See also Christopher Slobogin, Mental 
Illness and the Death Penalty, 24 MENT. PHYS. DIS. L. REP. 667, 669 (2000). 
 181 Slobogin, supra note 180, at 669-70. 
 182 Id. at 669 (citing David Baldus et al., EQUAL JUSTICE AND THE DEATH 
PENALTY, 644-45 (1990)). 
 183 FRONTLINE, Insanity Defense FAQs, at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/ 
frontline/shows/crime/trial/faqs.html (last visited March 1, 2005). 
 184 Aletha M. Claussen-Schulz et antilapse., Dangerousness, Risk Assessment, 
and Capital Sentencing, 10 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 471, 475-476, 481 (2004).  
 185 Slobogin, supra note 180, at 670 (citing Lawrence T. White, Juror Decision 
Making in the Capital Penalty Trial: An Analysis of Crimes and Defense Strategies, 11 
L. HUM. BEHAV. 113, 125 (1987); Phoebe C. Ellsworth et al., The Death-Qualified Jury 
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perception of the defendant’s future dangerousness at 
sentencing that appears to be the decisive factor in the decision 
to impose the death penalty, regardless of the level of the 
defendant’s culpability.186 
The impact of a severe mental disorder such as 
schizophrenia on a defendant is all-encompassing. When a 
psychiatrist or other mental health expert diagnoses an 
individual as severely mentally ill, that individual has been 
evaluated as having vulnerabilities that ordinary people do not 
share. These vulnerabilities span difficulties in obtaining 
adequate treatment to the inability to meaningfully participate 
in one’s legal defense. Professionals in the field of mental 
health, such as members of the American Psychological 
Association, recognize that these liabilities place the severely 
mentally ill in a category of persons who should be spared from 
the death penalty.187 As discussed in the next Part, Kelsey 
  
and the Defense of Insanity, 8 L. HUM. BEHAV. 81, 90 (1984)). 
 186 Slobogin, supra note 180, at 670.  
 187 AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION ONLINE, The Death Penalty in the 
United States, Resolution, available at http://www.apa.org/pi/deathpenalty.html? 
CFID=2646048&CFTOKEN=67528764 (last visited Dec. 23, 2004). People with bipolar 
disorder and schizoaffective disorder have characteristics that impact them in a 
manner sufficiently similar to individuals with mental retardation to the extent that 
they, too, should be treated in the same way during capital sentencing. Both of these 
illnesses entail impediments experienced by anyone with a severe mental disorder, 
including: psychosis and other psychiatric symptoms induced by brain disorder; 
recurrent need for hospitalization; lack of insight; complications with receiving 
adequate treatment; and the risk of being perceived as a future threat to society due to 
their psychiatric illness. See discussion supra Part IV.B. Additionally, people with 
bipolar disorder experience alternating episodes of mania and depression throughout 
their lifetimes. See NIMH, Bipolar Disorder: What is the Course of Bipolar Disorder? 
available at http://www.nimh.nih.gov/publicat/NIMHbipolar.pdf (last visited March 20, 
2005) [hereinafter NIMH, Bipolar Disorder]. While some individuals might experience 
asymptomatic interludes, “as many as one-third of people [with bipolar disorder] have 
some residual symptoms.” Id. Moreover, “a small percentage of people experience 
chronic unremitting symptoms despite treatment.” Id. A diagnosis of schizoaffective 
disorder, on the other hand, features symptoms of schizophrenia concurrent with 
symptoms of either depression, mania, or both. DSM-IV, supra note 53, at 292-96. This 
complexity of symptoms leads to challenges in diagnosis of this disorder. See NATIONAL 
ALLIANCE FOR THE MENTALLY ILL, Schizoaffective Disorder, available at 
http://www.nami.org/Content/ContentGroups/Helpline1/Schizoaffective_Disorder.htm 
(last visited Jan. 25, 2004); see also NMHA, Schizoaffective disorder, available at 
http://www.nmha.org/infoctr/factsheets/52.cfm (last visited Jan. 25, 2004) [hereinafter 
NMHA, Schizoaffective Disorder]. People with schizophrenia might appear to have 
deficiencies that lay persons more readily compare to people with mental retardation. 
In the absence of full appreciation for the consequences of enduring longstanding 
severe psychiatric illness by people with bipolar disorder or schizoaffective disorder, 
the public might understandably be hesitant to group these individuals within a 
category that includes offenders with mental retardation or schizophrenia. Yet given 
that people with bipolar disorder or schizoaffective disorder share the same core 
features of severe mental illness as those individuals with schizophrenia, they must 
certainly be deemed less culpable than the average murderer. Accordingly, they too 
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Patterson and James Colburn were, and Charles Walker is, 
among such persons. 
V. CASE ILLUSTRATIONS 
A. Kelsey Patterson 
Kelsey Patterson grew up in Palestine, Texas, raised by 
his grandmother after his mother died when he was four years 
old.188 He appeared to have a normal childhood and joined the 
military following high school.189 He received an honorable 
discharge after two years of service in order to care for his 
grandmother who had become terminally ill.190 Patterson’s half-
sister reports that his mental health began to deteriorate when 
his grandmother died, that he became withdrawn and began to 
talk and laugh to himself.191 When he was about twenty-four-
years old, the time period associated with a first psychotic 
break in males, Patterson was arrested for aggravated assault 
on a police officer.192 
In the ensuing years, Patterson was charged with the 
attempted murders of co-workers on two separate occasions.193 
Psychiatrists diagnosed him with paranoid schizophrenia and 
both times determined that he had been suffering from a 
mental disease or defect at the time of the crimes and could not 
conform his behavior to the law.194 Patterson was also arrested 
for assault.195 The episodes of violence were accompanied by 
paranoid ideation of being poisoned and raped.196 Patterson 
spent months at inpatient psychiatric centers, including a state 
hospital.197 
Despite a pattern of extremely violent and paranoid 
behavior, Patterson was evidently not receiving any significant 
treatment at the time he shot Louis Oates and Dorothy Harris 
  
should be excluded from the death penalty.  
 188 INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE PROJECT, Kelsey Patterson, available at 
http://www.internationaljusticeproject.org/illnessKPatterson.cfm (last visited Dec. 20, 
2004) [hereinafter IJP, Kelsely Patterson]. 
 189 Id. 
 190 Id. 
 191 AIUSA, Another Texas Injustice, supra note 1, at 3. 
 192 Id. See also DSM–IV, supra note 53, at 282. 
 193 Patterson, 2003 WL 21355999, at **1. See also IJP, Kelsey Patteron, supra 
note 190. 
 194 IJP, Kelsey Patteron, supra note 188. 
 195 Id. 
 196 Id. 
 197 Id. 
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in 1992.198 Although his half-brother had attempted to seek help 
for him prior to the murders,199 there is no mandatory 
treatment (i.e. involuntary commitment) for a person who is 
not imminently a danger to himself or others.200 It may be 
particularly difficult to obtain help even under ordinary 
circumstances in the State of Texas, which recently ranked 
47th in the United States for funding of treatment for the 
mentally ill.201  
Consistent with his psychiatric history, Patterson 
continued to exhibit symptoms of schizophrenia during his 
competency hearing and throughout his trial. The judge 
repeatedly ordered Patterson out of the courtroom due to 
outbursts during which he would claim that electrical devices 
had been inserted to his body or that he had been poisoned.202 
Yet the mental health experts involved did not seem to 
seriously consider these signs of severe mental illness.203 
Grigson, the state forensic psychiatrist who had previously 
found Patterson incompetent in 1980, undermined Patterson’s 
claims of being a victim of ongoing conspiracy, food poisoning, 
and inner ear implantation by suggesting that he had since 
learned how to fake psychotic symptoms in order to manipulate 
the judicial system.204 In contravention to professional medical 
standards, neither Grigson nor the state clinical psychologist 
Quijano had examined Patterson before declaring him to be 
competent.205  
  
 198 AIUSA, Another Texas Injustice, supra note 1, at 3-4. 
 199 Id. at 3.  
 200 See Amy E. Lansing et al., The Treatment of Dangerous Patients in 
Managed Care: Psychiatric Hospital Utilization and Outcome. 19 GEN. HOSP. 
PSYCHIATRY, 112, 112 (1997); Harriet P. Lefley, Cultural Perspectives on Families, 
Mental Illness, and the Law, 23 INT’L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 229, 237 (2000). See also 
AIUSA, Another Texas Injustice, supra note 1, at 3. 
 201 AIUSA, Another Texas Injustice, supra note 1, at 3. Fifth Circuit Judge 
Fortunato Benavides placed blame for the deaths on Texas’ mental health system. 
Mike Tolson, Mentally Ill Killer’s Life on the Line, HOUS. CHRON., Aug. 11, 2002, at 
A37.  
 202 Patterson, 2003 WL 21355999, at **2. The AIUSA report states that at one 
point the judge went so far as to order Patterson to be gagged with tape. AIUSA, 
Another Texas Injustice, supra note 1, at 11. 
 203 AIUSA, Another Texas Injustice, supra note 1, at 6-7. 
 204 Patterson, 2003 WL 21355999, at **5. See also AIUSA, Another Texas 
Injustice, supra note 1, at 7. 
 205 Indeed, Grigson, nicknamed “Dr. Death” because of his frequent testimony 
for the prosecution in capital murder cases, was later expelled by the American 
Psychiatric Association for making predictions about a defendant’s future 
dangerousness without having examined them. Pat Gillespie, James Grigson Expert 
Psychiatric Witness Was Nicknamed Dr. Death, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, June 14, 
2004, at 4B. Apparently, Grigson and Quijano had only reviewed the medical files 
 
 2/22/2005 6:19:12 PM 
2005] APPLYING ATKINS V. VIRGINA TO CAPITAL DEFENDANTS 1027 
In addition to this questionable assessment of his 
competence, Patterson himself further compromised his case 
through disruptive behavior during his state post-conviction 
hearing and imprudent decision-making in general. Despite the 
damning evidence against him, Patterson rejected the 
prosecution’s offer of a life sentence in exchange for a guilty 
plea, chose to testify during the guilt phase of his trial, and 
tried to fire his lawyers.206 Moreover, Patterson refused to 
submit to examination by mental health professionals.207 Like 
other mentally ill defendants before him, Patterson continually 
made decisions against counsel’s advice and disobeyed the 
judge’s orders in such a way as to demonstrate gross 
impairment of judgment and lack of self-control.208  
The prosecution, for its part, attempted to persuade the 
jury to treat Patterson’s schizophrenia only as an indicator of 
future dangerousness. “If you ever diagnose schizophrenia,” 
said the prosecutor, “what that is going to do is give that 
person a licence [sic] to kill anybody, anywhere, anytime, and 
they come in and say, 15 years ago some psychologist said I 
was schizophrenic. So, because of that I just blew two holes in 
two people’s heads. You can’t hold me responsible for it.”209 
Ultimately, Patterson’s rejection of a plea forced the jury to 
choose between the permanent penalty of death and a prison 
term which allowed for parole.  
Despite the senselessness of the murders and the 
prosecutor’s efforts to present evidence that Patterson had been 
malingering or at the least would prove dangerous, the jury 
nevertheless seemed to contemplate that he might not be 
deserving of capital punishment, as evidenced by their request 
for a dictionary to look up the meaning of “mitigating 
circumstances.”210 In the end, the jury found Patterson to be a 
future danger to society and that there was not sufficient 
  
related to a 1984 hospitalization. AIUSA, Another Texas Injustice, supra note 1, at 7.  
 206 AIUSA, Another Texas Injustice, supra note 1, at 9-11. 
 207 Id. at 14. 
 208 See, e.g., Kuby & Kunstler, supra note 173, at 23 (positing that a man who 
suffered from delusional disorder, although deemed competent, should not have been 
tried, because he “was clearly incapable of assisting in his own defense in any 
meaningful way” and “lacked the capacity to trust any attorney enough to actually and 
rationally evaluate the advice the attorney provided.”).  
 209 AIUSA, Another Texas Injustice, supra note 1, at 12. 
 210 Id. at 13. According to the AIUSA report, the judge denied the request and 
instead had the Charge reread which instructed that “[t]he jury shall consider 
mitigating evidence to be evidence that a juror might regard as reducing the 
defendant’s moral blameworthiness.” Id. at 13 n.16. 
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mitigating evidence to warrant a life sentence,211 which allows 
for the possibility of parole after forty years.212 
Patterson experienced insurmountable vulnerabilities 
as a severely mentally ill defendant. Much like a person with 
mental retardation, he displayed cognitive and behavioral 
defects that reduced his moral culpability. Furthermore, 
Patterson’s severe mental disorder diminished his ability to 
contain himself in the courtroom, or to participate adequately 
in his defense. Most significant, the jury considered Patterson 
to be at risk of future dangerousness, given his history of 
paranoia culminating in violence. This factor was dispositive of 
Governor Perry’s decision to deny clemency, despite the Texas 
Board of Pardons and Paroles’ 5-1 vote to recommend a life 
sentence on the eve of Patterson’s execution.213 Patterson’s 2004 
execution stirred debate over Texas’s lack of life without parole 
option for capital defendants whose circumstances call for 
mercy.214  
B. James Colburn 
The 2003 execution of James Colburn perhaps even 
more specifically highlighted the need to be conscious of the 
deficiencies of severely mentally ill individuals and to approach 
them with the same mindset as in the case of people with 
mental retardation. James Colburn was executed on March 26, 
2003 for the murder and attempted rape of Peggy Murphy.215 
Colburn, a man with an extensive psychiatric history, presents 
another apt example of an individual whose life might have 
been spared, if not for the impairments caused by his severe 
mental disorder. 
Colburn first saw a psychiatrist at age fourteen.216 By 
the time he reached seventeen in 1977 doctors had diagnosed 
  
 211 Id. at 13. 
 212 TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. § 37.071(2)(e)(2)(B) (2005) (describing 
procedure in capital case). 
 213 Editorial, Our Turn: Perry Ignores Facts to Allow Execution, SAN ANTONIO 
EXPRESS NEWS, May 20, 2004, at 6B.  
 214 See Editorial, supra note 213. See also, Editorial, Our View: Two More 
Death Penalty Inequities, SPRINGFIELD NEWS LEADER, May 21, 2004, at 8A; Associated 
Press, Senator Urges Sentencing Options, HOUS. CHRON., May 21, 2004, at 22; Scott 
Gold, The Nation: Texas Weighs Its Life or Death Decisions, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 15, 2004, 
at A17. 
 215 David Carson, TEXAS EXECUTION INFORMATION CENTER, James Colburn, 
at http://www.txexecutions.org/reports/301.asp (last visited Jan. 24, 2004).  
 216 Id.  
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him as having paranoid schizophrenia.217 Colburn suffered not 
only from hallucinations, delusions and suicidal thoughts, but 
also exhibited symptoms of posttraumatic stress disorder as a 
result of being raped while hitchhiking.218 Throughout his late 
teens, Colburn received psychiatric treatment for his condition, 
which included state hospitalization in 1979.219 His behavior 
was marked by suicide attempts, self-mutilation, enuresis,220 
and substance abuse attributed to his psychiatric disorder.221 
From 1977 to 1991, he incurred six felony convictions, 
including for aggravated robbery and arson, and served prison 
time.222 
During the week before the capital offense occurred, 
Colburn had allegedly experienced increased psychosis, 
eventually leading him to attempt an overdose on valium in 
response to hearing voices telling him to commit suicide.223 The 
next day he awoke to continued command auditory 
hallucinations and later met Murphy on the street outside his 
home.224 Colburn apparently invited Murphy into his home for a 
drink of water.225 After she resisted his sexual advances, he 
strangled her and stabbed her in the neck, killing her.226 
Colburn immediately reported the crime to his neighbor who 
phoned the police.227 Accounts of his videotaped confession 
described how Colburn rocked back and forth, lost control of his 
bladder, and shook uncontrollably.228  
  
 217 Id. This fact speaks to the longevity of Colburn’s illness, given that 
schizophrenia normally has an age of onset in the early to mid-20s for males. DSM-IV, 
supra note 53, at 282. 
 218 INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE PROJECT, Mental Illness, James Blake Colburn, at 
http://www.internationaljusticeproject.org/illnessJColburn.cfm (last visited Dec. 30, 
2003) [hereinafter IJP, James Blake Colburn]. 
 219 Id. 
 220 Enuresis is repeated urination during the course of the day into bed or 
clothing, not due to a general medical condition. DSM-IV, supra note 53, at 108. 
 221 IJP, James Blake Colburn, supra note 218.  
 222 Carson, supra note 215. 
 223  AIUSA, James Colburn: Mentally Ill Man Scheduled for Execution in 
Texas, at 3, at http://web.amnesty.org/aidoc/aidoc_pdf.nsf/Index/AMR511582002 
ENGLISH/$File/AMR115802.pdf (last visited Jan. 29, 2005) [hereinafter AIUSA, 
James Colburn]. In the months prior to Murphy’s murder, records indicate that 
Colburn had been receiving only sporadic outpatient treatment. Id. at 3. 
 224 Id.  
 225 Colburn v. Cockrell, 37 Fed.Appx. 90, 2002 WL 1021891, at **1 (5th Cir. 
May 9, 2002).  
 226 Id. 
 227 Id. One account reports that Colburn stated he killed Murphy in order to 
return to prison. Carson, supra note 215. 
  AIUSA, James Colburn, supra note 223, at 2. 228
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While being detained prior to trial, Colburn apparently 
received insufficient mental health treatment.229 Although 
Colburn was indigent, the Texas county jail that housed him 
required that he pay for medication from his inmate account.230 
Revealing of his complete lack of insight, Colburn instead chose 
to use his money towards small things like candy and soda.231 
Without the psychiatric care and structure of an adequate 
mental health regimen, Colburn’s condition during this period 
deteriorated to the point of ongoing suicidal ideation, urination 
and defecation on himself, auditory hallucinations, agitation, 
and need for physical restraint.232  
When a person such as Colburn suffers from a severe 
mental disorder, they require medication to control their 
symptoms.233 Throughout the course of the trial, Colburn 
exhibited signs of heavy sedation as a result of receiving 
regular injections of Haldol, a strong anti-psychotic drug.234 He 
at times was sufficiently drowsy or asleep as to snore loudly in 
court, prompting a recess in order for his lawyers to rouse 
him.235 His lawyers argued that the sedative effects of the 
medication prevented Colburn from effectively communicating 
with counsel or understanding the proceedings against him.236 
Although on appeal Colburn’s sedation was found not to impact 
his competency, certainly repeated lapses into unconsciousness 
placed Colburn at a disadvantage not normally experienced by 
the average defendant at trial. At the least, his demeanor may 
have caused him to come across as being disinterested in the 
proceedings around him. 
In addition to difficulties produced by the side effects of 
Haldol, Colburn’s case was also compromised by use of only the 
testimony of Walter Quijano, the court-appointed psychologist. 
Colburn’s lawyers during postconviction proceedings argued 
that his trial attorney should have hired a psychiatrist who 
could explain the pharmacological and medical evidence to the 
jury.237 Instead they relied on a psychologist who specialized in 
  
 229 Id. at 3. 
 230 Id. 
 231 Id. 
 232 Id. 
 233 See text accompanying footnote 117. 
 234 AIUSA, James Colburn, supra note 223, at 4. See also Patty Reinert, High 
Court Refuses Death Row Case, Mentally Ill Texas Man Will Seek Clemency from Perry, 
Lawyers Say, HOUS. CHRON., Jan. 2, 2003, at 5. 
 235 AIUSA, James Colburn, supra note 223, at 4. 
 236 Reinert, supra note 234. 
 237 Colburn v. Cockrell, 37 Fed.Appx. 90, 2002 WL 1021891, at **11 (5th Cir. 
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sex crimes238 and on Dr. Quijano, who, while finding that 
Colburn’s schizophrenia was “intractable,” “chronic,” “not 
expected to disappear,” and “difficult to treat,” determined that 
he was sane because Colburn knew at the time he committed 
the crime that his actions were wrong.239 It is possible that a 
more lucid defendant might have urged the use of the more 
favorable or informed testimony at his trial or played a more 
active role in his defense.240 Yet drowsy from medication during 
the course of the proceedings and “chronically mentally ill” as 
diagnosed by the court-appointed psychologist,241 Colburn did 
not appear to have had that opportunity. 
Despite the prosecutor’s efforts to convince jurors to 
consider solely the death penalty,242 they initially contemplated 
a life sentence. While in deliberation, the foreman specifically 
asked the judge whether a life sentence would entail the 
possibility of parole for Colburn.243 Afterwards, one juror was 
quoted as saying, “Had I realized that he would not finish 
serving his prison time until he was over 70 years of age, I 
sincerely believe that I would have voted to give him a life 
sentence.”244 Without this knowledge, and believing that 
Colburn presented a future danger to society, the jury 
eventually inflicted a sentence of death on Colburn.245 
C. Charles Walker 
While the involvement of Patterson and Colburn in 
their respective crimes is without question, Charles Walker’s 
role in the murder for which he was convicted is in dispute. 
Similar to Patterson, Walker refused to plea-bargain. His case 
stands apart from Patterson’s, however, in that Walker 
  
May 9, 2002). 
 238 Id.  
 239 AIUSA, James Colburn, supra note 223, at 3-4. 
 240 While trial preparation and witness selection are normally within the 
lawyer’s control, the lawyer has a duty to “reasonably consult with the client about the 
means by which the client’s objectives are to be accomplished.” AMERICAN BAR 
ASSOCIATION, Model Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.4, Communication. Here, 
there is no indication that Colburn’s trial attorney effectively communicated any 
strategies to Colburn, or that Colburn had even expressed his objectives. 
 241 AIUSA, James Colburn, supra note 223, at 4-5. 
 242 Id. at 5. 
 243 Id. The judge reportedly responded that issues of parole were not the jury’s 
concern. Id. 
 244 Id. 
 245 See IJP, James Colburn, supra note 218. 
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exposed himself to the death penalty when there were, and still 
remain, questions about his guilt. 
Like Patterson and Colburn before him, Charles Walker 
has been diagnosed with severe mental illness. Initially 
diagnosed with schizophrenia during childhood, he was later 
evaluated during his prosecution as having bipolar disorder 
with psychotic features.246 In 1995, he was convicted of the first 
degree murder of Tito Davidson.247 In December of 2004, he 
received a stay of execution pending further examination of 
claims that he is constitutionally ineligible for the death 
penalty and may in fact be innocent.248  
A glimpse of Walker’s background reveals an extensive 
history of mental illness compounded by extreme childhood 
abuse. Walker was born in Brooklyn, New York in 1965, to a 
“mentally unstable” father and a mother addicted to alcohol 
and cocaine.249 At age two, his father left and his mother 
remarried an abusive man who later shot and stabbed her.250 
His mother is said to have punished Walker repeatedly, 
including whipping him with electrical cords and a dog leash, 
denying him food, and burning his penis with an iron.251 Walker 
was first diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia at age ten 
when he received inpatient psychiatric treatment due to his 
bizarre and violent behavior, paranoia, auditory hallucinations, 
  
 246 See INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE PROJECT, Mental Illness: Charles Walker, at 
http://www.internationaljusticeproject.org/illnessCWalker.cfm (last visited Jan. 29, 
2005) [hereinafter IJP, Charles Walker]. “People with bipolar disorder who have these 
symptoms are sometimes incorrectly diagnosed as having schizophrenia.” NIMH, 
Bipolar Disorder, supra note 187. The mental health expert who examined Walker 
most recently found him to be “understandably depressed and anxious” and that his 
mental condition was currently in “remission.” State’s Answer to Defendant’s Motion 
for Appropriate Relief and Application for Stay at 27, State v. Walker, 469 S.E.2d 919 
(4th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 901 (1996) (Nos. 92CR 520762, 70920). The 
finding that Walker’s symptoms appear to be “in remission” is consistent with the 
general course of a severe mental disorder, which may include periods of exacerbation 
and remission. See supra notes 118 and 134. 
 247  See Motion for Appropriate Relief with Application for Stay of Execution 
at 1, Walker (Nos. 92CR 520762, 70920) [hereinafter MAR] (on file with author). 
 248  Order Regarding Claims I and VI at 5, Walker (Nos. 92CRS 20762, 70920) 
(on file with author). 
 249 MAR, supra note 247, at 8, 20. 
 250 Id. at 9. Walker’s cousin reports that Walker witnessed his mother’s 
boyfriend stab her, possibly describing the same incident. Id. at 20. Walker’s mother 
survived the attack and died in 1994 of acute and chronic cocaine intoxication. Id.  
 251 See IJP, Charles Walker, supra note 246. See also AIUSA, Urgent Action, 
Charles Anthony Walker, at http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGAMR511652004? 
open&of=ENG-USA (last visited Jan. 29, 2005) [hereinafter AIUSA, Charles Anthony 
Walker]; MAR, supra note 247, at 9, 20, 21-22. 
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and incoherent thought processes.252 His second hospitalization 
in 1976 at age eleven lasted about four months.253 
Accounts of his conduct during adolescence coincide 
with a diagnosis of schizophrenia.254 By age twelve, he lived on 
the streets of New York City.255 When in school, he attended a 
special education program, but his attendance was at best 
sporadic.256 At seventeen years old, Walker went to prison for 
shooting a man he claimed had been following him around to 
hurt him.257 He did not receive treatment during the 
approximately six years of his incarceration.258 Less than two 
years after his release, Walker’s parole was revoked and he 
returned to prison for another year until his release in 1991 
when he was twenty-five years old.259 On August 11, 1992, Tito 
Davidson, the young man Walker is alleged to have murdered, 
disappeared in Greensboro, North Carolina.260 
The circumstances surrounding Davidson’s 
disappearance are vague. On August 13, 1992, an anonymous 
informant relayed to police that a body had been placed in the 
dumpster of a particular apartment.261 Police searched through 
the trash, and, finding nothing, looked through tons of landfill 
refuse as well, without finding a body.262 The statements of 
Antonio Wrenn, a suspect in an unrelated shooting, eventually 
led authorities to six other alleged participants in Davidson’s 
suspected murder: Rahshar Darden; Pamela Haizlip; Jesse 
Thompson; Sabrina Wilson; Nickie Summers; and Charles 
Walker.263 
As in the cases of Patterson and Colburn, the outcome of 
the legal proceedings demonstrate that Walker, as a person 
with a severe mental disorder, was enormously disadvantaged. 
Walker’s co-participants, Darden, Thompson, Wrenn, and 
Haizlip each had the wherewithal to accept plea arrangements, 
while Wilson and Summers cooperated with the State in 
  
 252 IJP, Charles Walker, supra note 246. MAR, supra note 247, at 9.  
 253 MAR, supra note 247, at 9. 
 254 IJP, Charles Walker, supra note 246. See also AIUSA, Charles Anthony 
Walker, supra note 251. 
 255 AIUSA, Charles Anthony Walker, supra note 251. 
 256 MAR, supra note 247, at 20-21. 
 257 Id. At 9-10. Walker had been living in an abandoned building at the time. 
AIUSA, Charles Anthony Walker, supra note 251. 
 258 AIUSA, Charles Anthony Walker, supra note 251. 
 259 Id.  
 260 MAR, supra note 247, at 2. 
 261 AIUSA, Charles Anthony Walker, supra note 251. 
 262 Id. 
 263 Id. See also MAR, supra note 247, at 2-3. 
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providing testimony and were never charged.264 Walker, on the 
other hand, described by the psychiatrist who evaluated him 
during this period as paranoid that the defense counsel was 
assisting the prosecution,265 refused the state’s offer of a second-
degree murder plea.266 Dr. Billy Royal noted Walker to be not 
only “extremely paranoid,” but also “highly grandiose [with] 
profound difficulties in distinguishing fantasy from reality.”267 
Just as Patterson and Colburn had been found competent to 
stand trial, Dr. Royal found Walker to be legally competent.268 
Yet Dr. Royal qualified his evaluation with the following 
statement: 
Mr. Walker throughout the interviews had an inability to deal with 
the reality of what was going on in terms of his legal status, trial, 
options that he had. There was a consistent view of himself that was 
different from what the facts of life showed, in terms of his behaviour 
[sic] and functioning. He was never able to come to grips or deal 
adequately in a major way with his attorneys, or with myself, or 
with other persons who tried to deal with him in terms of his legal 
status, the evidence that appeared to be related to his crime or what 
his potential was for the future.269  
Walker’s decision converted the proceedings into a 
capital case. Although the state of North Carolina now allows 
  
 264 MAR, supra note 247, at 2-3. Haizlip admitted proximity and pled to 
accessory to murder with time served in exchange for testimony. Id. at 3. Darden 
admitted shooting Davidson in the chest four times and once between the eyes. He 
served a total of six years for murder 2. Wrenn pled to accessory to murder 1 and 
served seven years. Id. Thompson admitted slashing Davidson’s throat and bragged 
about firing the shot that killed him. He pled to murder 2 and received a life sentence. 
He is now eligible for parole. Id. See IJP, Charles Walker, supra note 246. See also 
Danica Coto, Inmate on Death Row Spared in Final Hours, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, Dec. 
3, 2004, at 1A; AIUSA, Charles Anthony Walker, supra note 251; Lisa Hoppenjans, 
Judge Stays Friday’s Execution of a Greensboro Man, WINSTON SALEM J., Nov. 30, 
2004, at B1. 
 265 See IJP, Charles Walker, supra note 246; MAR, supra note 247, at 21. 
 266 See IJP, Charles Walker, supra note 246. Forensic psychiatrist Dr. 
Seymour Halleck made a thorough review of this case, including school and prison 
records, and interviewed Walker in person. Dr. Halleck expressed particular concern 
about “the severe limitation upon Walker’s ability to cooperate with his trial attorneys 
due to his paranoid belief that they were helping the prosecutor.” MAR, supra note 247, 
at 21. 
 267 IJP, Charles Walker, supra note 246. It should be noted that although Dr. 
Royal interviewed Walker and his family and reviewed certain records, the psychiatrist 
was impeached because he had not reviewed Walker’s school or prison records and he 
was unaware of Walker’s extreme childhood abuse history. MAR, supra note 247, at 10-
11, 21. However, Dr. Royal had first-hand knowledge of Walker’s behavior during the 
legal proceedings and it is for this reason that Dr. Royal’s perceptions of Walker at that 
time are included. 
 268 Id.  
 269 Id.  
 2/22/2005 6:19:12 PM 
2005] APPLYING ATKINS V. VIRGINA TO CAPITAL DEFENDANTS 1035 
for prosecutorial discretion in trying a defendant capitally for 
first degree murder when an aggravating circumstance is 
present, this option did not exist until 2001.270 Due to the 
especially cruel nature of the murder allegations and because 
Walker had a prior violent felony conviction, the state had no 
recourse at that time but to seek the death penalty for 
Walker.271 Without adequate consultation with defense counsel 
and by his own impaired judgment, Walker had placed his life 
at stake. 
The trial contained a number of weaknesses that 
Walker might have been able to challenge if he had been free of 
severe mental illness. The prosecution relied solely on the 
uncorroborated testimony of co-participants who had reached 
plea agreements with the State. There was no physical 
evidence linking Walker to the crime.272 The testimony provided 
by the participants contained numerous inconsistencies.273 
Additionally, because Walker refused to provide information 
about his history of mental illness and severe childhood abuse 
to Dr. Royal,274 the jury did not hear all relevant mitigating 
evidence.275  
The magnitude and complexity of a capital trial under 
“ideal” circumstances would seem to require that a defendant, 
at a minimum, collaborate with defense counsel. Walker’s 
apparent paranoia towards his own attorneys can be 
analogized to the lapse in procedural protections that could 
occur due to the mental retardation of a defendant, which 
caused the Court significant concern in Atkins.276 Being at 
extreme odds with defense counsel undoubtedly decreases the 
communication between attorney and defendant. In Walker’s 
  
 270 State v. Ward, 555 S.E.2d 251, 260 (N.C. 2001). 
 271 AIUSA, Charles Anthony Walker, supra note 251, at 1. See also N.C. GEN. 
STAT. § 15A-2000(a)(1) (2004). 
 272 MAR, supra note 247, at 12-15.  
 273 Darden testified that Walker had hit Davidson on the knee with a 
hammer, but Haizlip testified that it was Thompson who had hit Davidson with the 
hammer. Id. at 6. Darden also testified that Walker had fired the fatal shot at 
Davidson’s neck, but this testimony was contradicted by accounts that Thompson had 
bragged about fatally shooting Davidson in the chest. Id. at 16. 
 274 Id. at 30. 
 275 Review of an Amnesty International report and State v. Walker, suggests 
that Walker’s relatives came forth sometime after his conviction to provide further 
illumination of his background. 469 S.E.2d 919 (N.C. 1996); AIUSA, Charles Anthony 
Walker, supra note 251. The additional information referred to has been brought up on 
appeal. MAR, supra note 247, at 19-22. Walker was able to share details about his past 
with Dr. Seymour Halleck, the psychiatrist who examined him most recently. Id. at 21.  
 276 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 317 (2002). 
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case, at the least his mitigation evidence could have been more 
thoroughly developed in a timely manner. The combined effect 
of Walker’s compromised mental state, the nature of the 
testimony presented at trial, and the deficient mitigation 
evidence possibly jeopardized the fairness of his proceedings. 
Although the jury acquitted Walker of delivering the 
fatal gunshot wound, the jurors recommended a sentence of 
death after four days of deliberations.277 Based on the testimony 
of witnesses, albeit uncorroborated, the jury found that Walker 
had “acted in concert with others with the intent to kill 
Davidson.”278 Again the issue of future dangerousness appears 
to have played a key role in the sentencing. The jury 
recommended the death penalty despite finding that Walker 
had been mentally or emotionally disturbed at the time of the 
crime and that his disturbances were caused by childhood 
trauma and mental illness.279 The jurors considered the 
possibility that Walker would be paroled under a life sentence 
influential to their decision.280 Two jurors suggested that they 
would have found the additional mitigating evidence brought 
up on appeal to be significant.281 Further, some of the jurors 
later expressed that life without parole was the appropriate 
sentence for Walker, but it had not been available at that 
time.282 Not only did Walker’s rejection of a plea agreement turn 
the proceedings into a capital case, but his failure to cooperate 
with defense counsel may have prevented the jury’s access to 
the complete mitigation evidence, evidence which had the 
potential to outweigh concerns about future dangerousness.  
  
 277 AIUSA, Charles Anthony Walker, supra note 251. This recommendation 
was controversial, because no person has ever been executed in North Carolina in a 
case in which the body was never found. See Estes Thompson, Condemned Man’s 
Lawyers Say Case Lacks Evidence: Inmate to Be Executed for Slaying in Which Body 
Was Never Found, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, Nov. 30, 2004, at 3B. 
 278 MAR, supra note 247, at 11.  
 279 State v. Walker, 469 S.E.2d at 924 (N.C. 1996). 
 280 North Carolina adopted a life without parole option in October of 1994 
which did not apply retrospectively. For offenses occurring prior to that date, a 
sentencer had to choose between death or life imprisonment with the possibility of 
parole after twenty years. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2002(a) (2004). See also MAR, 
supra note 247, at 24.  
 281 One specifically stated that she would not have voted for the death penalty. 
See MAR, supra note 247, at 22. The mitigating evidence described in State v. Walker, 
while in itself troubling, does not convey the full breadth of Walker’s history of 
psychiatric illness or trauma and thus suggests that the jury could not have had a full 
appreciation for the severity of the abuse or mental illness experienced by Walker. Id. 
at 19-22. 
 282 Id. at 24. 
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Patterson and Colburn’s lives were marked, and 
Walker’s life has been marked, by a history of psychiatric 
symptoms, sporadic, reactive attempts to treat them, and 
coinciding maladaptation to normal life activities. While their 
intelligence levels may not have been subaverage, their severe 
mental disorders rendered them both less culpable and more 
vulnerable during legal proceedings. These same attributes 
were sufficient to convince the Supreme Court to 
constitutionalize the consensus that defendants with mental 
retardation should not be executed. Although jurors appeared 
to recognize that Patterson, Colburn, and Walker suffered from 
severe mental disorders, the defendants’ illnesses were not 
considered as mitigating factors. The sentencers in Patterson 
and Colburn’s cases ultimately chose to view the mental 
disorders as aggravators, and in Walker’s case this vital 
information was simply unavailable. But as discussed above, a 
complete picture of the impact of severe mental illness on the 
individual reveals that execution was and is a disproportionate 
punishment for each of these three defendants.  
VI. TENNARD V. DRETKE, SEVERE MENTAL ILLNESS AS AN 
AGGRAVATOR, AND THE IMPLICATIONS OF EXTENDING 
ATKINS TO DEFENDANTS WITH SEVERE MENTAL ILLNESS  
A. Tennard v. Dretke283 
If severe mental illness is accepted as comparable to 
mental retardation in its impact on the individual, it must also 
have comparable mitigating effect. As explained in Tennard, 
the mitigating effect of mental retardation under Atkins is 
broad. 
Tennard involved a man described as “gullible” with an 
I.Q. of 67 who was convicted of capital murder in Texas.284 
Tennard had sought postconviction relief, claiming that the 
jury instructions did not allow the sentencer to give mitigating 
effect to Tennard’s low I.Q. and gullibility.285 After Tennard lost 
his appeals in the lower courts, the Fifth Circuit held that he 
was not entitled to a certificate of appealability because his I.Q. 
score did not establish mental retardation, and that even if it 
  
 283 124 S. Ct. 2562 (2004).  
 284 Id. at 2565-66. 
 285 Id. at 2566-67. 
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did, “[Tennard] did not show that the crime he committed was 
attributable to his low I.Q.”286  
The Supreme Court rejected the Fifth Circuit’s 
requirement that a nexus exist between low I.Q. and the 
capital crime in order to consider mental retardation as a 
mitigator.287 In the Court’s holding, Justice O’Connor clarified 
that “[i]mpaired intellectual functioning has mitigating 
dimension beyond the impact it has on the individual’s ability 
to act deliberately.”288 Indeed, Atkins had explained that 
“impaired intellectual functioning is inherently mitigating.”289 
Likewise, just as the issue in the case of a defendant with 
mental retardation would not be whether that defendant’s low 
I.Q. caused the crime, the issue in the case of a person with 
severe mental illness would not be limited to whether that 
person was actively psychotic at the time the capital crime was 
committed. In this respect, any concerns about a lack of nexus 
between a severe mental disorder and the crime would be 
entirely at odds with the Tennard holding.290 “The question is 
  
 286 Id. at 2568. 
 287 Id. at 2570.  
 288 Tennard, 124 S. Ct. at 2572 (emphasis added).  
 289 Id. at 2571. 
 290 The American Psychiatric Association (APA) appears to erroneously raise a 
parallel concern in a statement advocating the exclusion of defendants with severe 
mental illness from capital punishment. Although the APA states that “[T]he core 
rationale for precluding death sentences for defendants with mental retardation is 
equally applicable to defendants with severe mental illness,” the APA retreats from 
this position. The APA proposes modifying the language of the Model Penal Code to 
include prohibiting the execution of defendants if, at the time of the offense, they had a 
“severe mental disorder” that “significantly impaired” their capacity “to exercise 
rational judgment in relation to their conduct.” In doing so, the APA uses legal 
provisions to narrow a medical classification of mental disorders. AMERICAN 
PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, Position Statement, Diminished Responsibility in Capital 
Sentencing, Nov. 2004. By tying the definition of severe mental disorders to the 
insanity defense, the APA clearly does not incorporate the substance of Tennard into 
its suggested changes. The APA bases its proposed changes on its concern that “[E]ven 
among persons with major mental disorders, such as schizophrenia, symptoms vary 
widely in severity, as does the impact of the disorder on the person’s behavior.” Id. Yet 
among persons with mental retardation, the level of impairment of intelligence also 
varies widely, so much so that the APA has divided the levels into four categories, in 
addition to a general category where mental retardation is strongly presumed, but the 
person’s intelligence is not testable. DSM-IV, supra note 53, at 40. The limitations in 
adaptive skills, too, vary widely among individuals with mental retardation. Indeed, in 
their definitions of mental retardation, both the AAMR and APA require limitiations in 
as few as two areas of adaptive skills which include: communication, self-care, home 
living, and social skills. See DSM-IV, supra note 53, at 46. See also AAMR, supra note 
52. Despite this variation, the Atkins Court did not deem it necessary to narrow the 
category of individuals with mental retardation, where this condition reduces their 
moral culpaibility in general. See supra text accompanying note 56. In light of the 
argument that a death sentence would essentially be disproportionate to the 
culpability of the offender with severe mental illness for the reasons set forth in this 
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simply whether the evidence is of such a character that it 
‘might serve as a basis for a sentence less than death.’”291 
By clarifying the expansive role mental retardation 
plays in mitigation, the Court in Tennard acknowledged and 
cautioned against the tendency to give a low IQ aggravating 
effect in considering future dangerousness, but to dismiss 
mental retardation as irrelevant in mitigation.292 As described 
above, this problematic interpretation occurs frequently in 
cases of severely mentally ill defendants, in which the 
prosecutor is all too ready to instill jurors with a sense that the 
defendant before them is dangerous and will kill again, thereby 
urging them to disregard the mitigating effects of the mental 
disorder and recommend a sentence of death.293 
B. Severe Mental Illness as an Aggravator 
The factfinder’s tendency to consider severe mental 
illness an aggravator is aptly illustrated by the sentencing of 
Patterson and Colburn. The Texas capital sentencing scheme 
gained much attention after Penry for its cumbersome jury 
instructions, which even after revision remain confusing, and 
the statute continues to raise controversy for its lack of a life 
without parole option.294 In a discussion addressing this issue, 
Amnesty International, a human rights organization, notes: 
Even today, there is public fear and ignorance around the subject of 
mental illness. Under the Texas capital sentencing scheme, even if 
the defence [sic] attorneys put on a persuasive case that their client’s 
mental illness demands compassion, it may not be enough to 
overcome jurors’ fears of the individual in front of them, whom they 
have just convicted of a violent crime . . . a prosecutor’s bid for a 
death sentence may lead such officials to play on juror fears and 
make a death sentence more likely under Texas’s capital sentencing 
scheme.295 
A defendant like Kelsey Patterson with an unequivocal 
history of violent behavior would arouse understandable 
  
Note, the Court, and certainly the APA, should not narrow the category of capital 
defendants with severe mental illness by requiring a nexus between the defendants’ 
severe mental illness and the capital crime or the capacity to commit it. 
 291 Tennard, 124 S. Ct. at 2571 (internal citations omitted). 
 292 Id. at 2572. 
 293 See AIUSA, Another Texas Injustice, supra note 1, at 11-12. See also 
Tennard, 124 S. Ct. at 2572-73. 
 294 TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. § 37.071(2)(e)(2)(B), supra note 212 
(describing procedure in a capital case).  
 295 AIUSA, James Colburn, supra note 223, at 5. 
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concerns for the jury. However, the circumstances surrounding 
the sentencing of James Colburn make it clear that at least 
some jurors feel a compassion for defendants with severe 
mental illness that conflicts with their desire to prevent harm 
to society. These jurors must be given a “vehicle for expressing 
[their] ‘reasoned moral response’ to that [mitigating] evidence 
in rendering its sentencing decision.”296 The function of 
mitigation provisions in state death penalty statutes otherwise 
becomes meaningless when the factfinder is not able to 
acknowledge the qualities of a defendant that reduce 
culpability. Furthermore, to disregard a defendant’s severe 
mental disorder is to treat that defendant as an average 
murderer and neglect to make a distinction between offenders 
who are more deserving of capital punishment than others.297  
C. The Implications of Extending Atkins to Defendants with 
Severe Mental Illness 
A categorical exclusion of the severely mentally ill 
would put to rest apprehensions about executing individuals 
whose mitigating circumstances make them less culpable than 
the average murderer. Still, such an exclusion may be difficult 
for lay persons and the legal community to embrace, in part 
because it opens up the probability that psychiatry (i.e. the 
medical profession) will have a greater hand in determining 
who can be disqualified from a death sentence.298 Whereas 
defendants with schizophrenia, schizoaffective disorder or 
bipolar disorder who failed to successfully plead insanity were 
previously executed, under the proposed exemption they would 
no longer be eligible for the death penalty as individuals 
diagnosed as suffering from severe mental disorders. As in the 
  
 296 Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 328 (1989) (quoting Franklin v. Lynaugh, 
487 U.S. 164, 184 (1988)). 
 297 Berkman, supra note 65, at 293. 
 298 Concerns of inconsistency of diagnoses by physicians should be quashed. It 
is the similar presentation of the individuals with schizophrenia, schizoaffective 
disorder and bipolar disorder in terms of symptoms, behavioral deficits, and 
disadvantages in criminal proceedings that substantively matter, not the names of 
their conditions. Because these severe mental illnesses share common traits that make 
it difficult to differentiate between the disorders, it is not unusual for physicians, 
mental health professionals, and researchers to discuss them in tandem. See DSM-IV, 
supra note 53, at 283-84; NIMH, Bipolar Disorder, supra note 187, at 4; NMHA, 
Schizoaffective Disorder, supra note 187; Benabarre, supra note 114; Martin Harrow et 
al., Ten-Year Outcome: Patients with Schizoaffective Disorders, Schizophrenia, Affective 
Disorders and Mood-Incongruent Psychotic Symptoms, 177 BRIT. J. PSYCHIATRY 421 
(2000).  
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Atkins case and Ford v. Wainwright before it, each State must 
develop “appropriate ways” to carry out this categorical 
exclusion,299 particularly when the prosecution disputes that a 
defendant is severely mentally ill. When a person is diagnosed 
with a severe mental disorder after sentencing, that death 
sentence would thereafter be commuted in order to comply with 
the Eighth Amendment. Additionally, in order to ensure due 
process and avert wrongful execution, the issue of mandatory 
evaluation might be raised where defendants suspected to have 
mental health issues refuse psychiatric examination.300  
The Atkins court did not express concern that a 
categorical exclusion of people with mental retardation from 
the death penalty would increase the number of capital 
offenses committed by that population, nor should this worry 
exist with respect to individuals with a severe mental disorder. 
Persons with severe mental disorders comprise a very small 
portion of society to begin with and the prevalence of violence 
associated with them is modest.301 Moreover, an exemption 
would not exculpate the severely mentally ill from punishment 
for serious crimes they in fact perpetrate. Rather, such an 
exemption would recognize that the experiences of persons 
afflicted with a severe mental disorder in developing a chronic 
illness over time and dealing with its impact emotionally, 
socially and in the courtroom, are accompanied by 
vulnerabilities that may be unfathomable to the ordinary 
person. 
Creating a categorical exclusion of the severely mentally 
ill from the death penalty requires offering alternative 
sentences that adhere to the Eighth Amendment’s proscription 
  
 299 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 317 (2002). 
 300 The desire to protect client autonomy at times conflicts with the criminal 
defense attorney’s role of providing effective representation. For a framework with 
which to address this dilemma, see Christopher Slobogin, The Criminal Defense 
Lawyer’s Fiduciary Duty to Clients with Mental Disability, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1581 
(1999). 
 301 Mental retardation affects between 1.5% to 2.5% of the population. AAMR, 
Fact Sheet: The Death Penalty, at http://www.aamr.org/Policies/faq_death_penalty.shtml 
(last visited Feb. 1, 2005). Approximately 1.2% of American adults develop 
schizophrenia. This estimate may also include those persons with schizoaffective 
disorder. William E. Narrow et al., Revised Prevalence Estimates of Mental Disorders in 
the United States, 59 ARCH. GEN PSYCHIATRY, 115, 121, Table 4 (Feb. 2002). Bipolar 
disorder affects roughly 1.2% of the population. NAMI, Bipolar Disorder, at 
http://www.nami.org/Template.cfm?Section=By_Illness&template=/ 
ContentManagement/ContentDisplay.cfm&ContentID=10442 (last visited Feb. 1, 
2005). See also Elizabeth Walsh et al., Violence and Schizophrenia: Examining the 
Evidence, 180 BRIT. J. PSYCHIATRY 490 (June 2002).  
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against cruel and unusual punishment. There will be instances 
when a life sentence without parole may be appropriate, but 
effort should be made to explore institutionalization in a 
psychiatric setting where a defendant who is diagnosed with 
chronic schizophrenia, schizoaffective disorder or bipolar 
disorder may receive sufficient, ongoing treatment. More 
importantly, given that the larger societal concern appears to 
be the fear of future dangerousness, policymakers within the 
criminal justice system should combine their efforts with 
mental health experts to work towards violence prevention in 
identified high-risk individuals.  
Based on the literature,302 resources should be 
concentrated on increasing treatment compliance, reducing 
substance abuse, and working with health care bodies such as 
managed care companies to ensure adequate length of 
inpatient psychiatric stays, or comprehensive outpatient 
programs. A monitoring program should be required for any 
severely mentally ill person with a known history of violent 
behavior who refuses treatment, particularly if that person has 
a co-existing substance abuse disorder. The potential benefits 
of tracking these patients, perhaps through daily, face-to-face 
contact with case managers, should outweigh any disquiet over 
expenses incurred to supervise individuals who might not 
currently appear in need of care. The cornerstone of 
implementing these improvements would lie in educating the 
public about mental illness and the need for a comprehensive 
mental health system that addresses all facets of the afflicted 
individual’s life, not simply treatment. Lawmakers should be 
urged to invest in preventive measures rather than merely 
fund the expansion of the penal system. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The concept of “evolving standards of decency” suggests 
a movement towards a more sensitive and informed morality 
that analyzes the developmental, functional, and cognitive 
makeup of offenders when assessing culpability. Indeed, in an 
opinion that echoed the Atkins rationale, the Supreme Court 
recently determined that the death penalty is disproportionate 
punishment for juveniles.303 Although current legislation and 
case law may suggest that American society is not yet at the 
  
 302 See supra text accompanying note 158. 
 303 Roper v. Simmons, 125 S.Ct. 1183 (2005).  
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same point that the Supreme Court found it to be when it 
decided Atkins in favor of individuals with mental retardation, 
existing statutory provisions, the views of justices and religious 
communities, national polls, and official statements by 
professional bodies indicate that at least a significant segment 
of the American public agrees with the widely held 
international belief that people with severe mental disorders 
should be spared from capital punishment. 
It may be that society’s moral compass will someday 
mature in a way that execution of the severely mentally ill will 
be deemed unconstitutional. This maturity is likely to be 
bolstered by a conscious effort to create an informed citizenry, 
legislature, and criminal justice system which address and 
incorporate the realities of mental illness into their decision-
making, rather than shun the lessons of medical and mental 
health professionals. In the interim, Justice Stevens’ opinion in 
Atkins serves as a highly applicable rationale for courts to 
consider in capital sentencing proceedings for defendants with 
severe mental disorders. 
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